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1Abstract
The FDA has made great strides over the past twenty years in loosening drug approval regulations to speed
important, life-saving treatments to market. However, recent controversies involving anti-depressants for
children and the withdrawal of two popular arthritis drugs and a multiple sclerosis therapy have created
fears within the cancer community that the FDA will revert to a more cautious, conservative approval
policy. Although cancer patient advocates have legitimate concerns about the pendulum swinging back to
a more conservative agency stance, the FDA and the Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee (ODAC) do
not appear to have embraced a more risk-averse philosophy. Instead, the public backlash against the FDA
presents the agency with an excellent opportunity to facilitate improvements to the accelerated approval and
fast-track regulations for the beneﬁt of cancer patients.
2Introduction
Throughout its history, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has almost constantly endured criticism
that drug approval processes in the United States are too slow, cumbersome and expensive.1 In particular, the
agency has been criticized for being too cautious and restrictive in approving life-saving drugs for people with
terminal medical conditions.2 The emergence of the Acquired Immune Deﬁciency Syndrome (AIDS) crisis
in the 1980s generated substantial political pressure that forced the FDA to make signiﬁcant policy changes
to both expand access to experimental therapies and expedite approvals for drugs intended to treat life-
threatening diseases.3 Starting in the early 1990s, the agency implemented several mechanisms to facilitate
and accelerate drug approvals in the United States, culminating in the formalization of these regulations
in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997.4 Despite the occasional misstep, the fast-track programs and
accelerated approval regulations have been responsible for expediting the development, review, and approval
of many important, life-saving drugs.5 Cancer patients have been particularly fortunate as nearly a third
of the sixty cancer drugs approved by the agency since 1995 have reached the market through accelerated
approval mechanisms.6 As a result, the FDA has been lauded for ensuring the safety and eﬀectiveness of
1Christine Gorman, Can the FDA Heal Itself?, Time, Feb. 28, 2005, at 58.
2Dan Cray, Balancing Act: Cutting Red Tape at the FDA Has Given a Big Boost to an AIDS-Fighting Biotech Firm, Time,
June 9, 1997, at 109; see also Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening
Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 295, 306-07 (2000).
3Id. at 315-27.
4FDA Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 101, 111 Stat. 2296, 2296-2305 (1997); see also Deborah G. Parver,
Expediting the Drug Approval Process: an Analysis of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 1249 (1999).
5Sheila R. Shulman and Jeﬀrey S. Brown, The Food and Drug Administration’s Early Access and Fast-Track Approval Ini-
tiatives: How Have They Worked?, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 503, 505 (1995); see also Christopher-Paul Milne and Elaine Bergman,
Fast Track Product Designation Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act: The Industry Experience, Drug
Information Journal, Jan./Mar., 2001, at 71; Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development, FDA’s Fast Track
Initiative Cut Total Drug Development Time by 3 Years, Impact Report, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 2 (hereinafter Tufts CSDD
Fast-Track Study).
6Thomas G. Roberts, Jr. and Bruce A. Chabner, Beyond Fast Track for Drug Approvals, New England Journal of Medicine,
Jul. 29, 2004, at 502; see also Richard L. Schilsky, Hurry Up and Wait: Is Accelerated Approval of New Cancer Drugs in the
Best Interests of Cancer Patients?, Journal of Clinical Oncology, Oct. 2003, at 3718.
3drugs while also tending to the needs of desperate patients.7
However, recent controversies over the FDA’s inability to monitor drug safety have generated a substantial
backlash against the agency.8 Public outrage over the FDA’s alleged withholding of safety data regarding
antidepressant use by children, the withdrawal of two pain-killers used by millions of Americans, and the
withdrawal of an accelerated approval multiple sclerosis drug, have created a perception that the agency is
overly susceptible to the inﬂuence of the pharmaceutical industry and no longer capable of regulating drug
safety in the U.S.9 After years of successfully pressuring the FDA to adopt more liberal drug approval policies,
the cancer community now fears that negative public sentiment will force the agency to revert to a lengthy,
cautious framework for evaluating new oncology drugs.10 Although cancer activists are understandably
concerned about the pendulum swinging back to a more conservative agency stance, the FDA and the
Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee (ODAC) do not appear to have embraced a more risk-averse philosophy
with regards to oncology products.11 Instead, the general public backlash against the FDA presents the
agency with an excellent opportunity to facilitate improvements to the accelerated approval and fast-track
regulations for the beneﬁt of cancer patients.
Section I of this paper is a historical examination of FDA drug approval regulations from the inception of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, through the AIDS crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
7Id.; see also Carl M. Cannon, Letter from Washington: Bitter Pills, Forbes, May 28, 2001, at 21.
8See Gorman, supra note 1, at 58.
9Id.; see also Anna W. Mathews and John Hechinger, Are Too Many Unproven Drugs Receiving FDA Early Approval?
Process Comes Under Scrutiny, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 1, 2005, at B1.
10Scott Gottlieb, FDA Moves Cancer Cures Into the Slow Lane, Forbes Investment Newsletter, Jan. 18, 2005. Available at:
http://www.forbes.com/investmentnewsletters/2005/01/18/cz sg 0118soapbox inl. html.
11FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Charter. Available at: http://www.fda.gov/cder/audiences/ acspage/ Oncolog-
iccharter1.htm. The ODAC reviews and evaluates data concerning the safety and eﬀectiveness of marketed and investigational
human drug products for use in the treatment of cancer and makes appropriate recommendations to the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs. Members of ODAC include authorities on oncology and related professions, an industry representative, and
a consumer representative.
4to the formalized fast-track and accelerated approval regulations in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997.
Section II analyzes the success of the various elements of the fast-track and accelerated approval regulations
in expediting important, life-saving drugs to the U.S. market. Section III examines the recent public backlash
against the FDA, the growing fears of the cancer community, and the legitimacy of the cancer community’s
concerns. Section IV takes a brief look at proposed FDA reforms and outlines recommendations for the FDA
to improve post-marketing study compliance.
Section I. The Evolution of FDA Drug Approval Regulations
A. History of FDA Drug Approval Authority
Over the course of the FDA’s existence, the agency’s historically risk-averse perspective has tempered the
evolution of policies and regulations regarding the approval of new drugs in the United States. With the
inception of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938, the FDA was built on a solid
foundation of consumer protection and a vigilant outlook on new drug approvals.12 The impetus for the
passage of the FDCA was the signiﬁcant public health catastrophe resulting from the distribution of Elixir of
Sulfanilamide; a poisonous drug that caused nearly a hundred deaths after reaching the market without any
safety testing.13 In response to public outcries over the unsafe elixir, the FDCA established the statutory
requirement that any new drug would have to receive FDA review prior to entering the marketplace.14 The
12Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codiﬁed as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)).
13Beth E. Myers, The Food and Drug Administration’s Experimental Drug Approval System: Is It Good For Your Health?,
28 Hous. L. Rev. 309, 311-12 (1991). The Elixir of Sulfanilamide was made using the toxic solvent diethylene glycol.
14Joel Hoﬀman, The Food and Drug Administration’s Administrative Procedures, in Food and Drug Law 16 (Richard M.
Cooper ed., 1991).
5FDCA empowered the FDA to stop unsafe drugs from reaching the public by requiring a demonstration that
a new drug was safe for human consumption.15 Drug manufacturers were required to submit a new drug
application (NDA) for FDA review, and the agency had sixty days to aﬃrmatively respond.16 However, if
the FDA did not respond within the sixty-day time frame, the NDA was considered approved, and the drug
manufacturer was allowed to proceed with further development and commercialization.17 Therefore, even
with the passage of the FDCA, there were still opportunities for unsafe drugs to enter the market.
While the FDCA birthed a more cautious process of regulating pre-market drug approvals, the Thalido-
mide crisis in the early 1960s and the consequent Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 solidiﬁed both the
FDA’s authority and the agency’s conservative approach to drug approvals.18 Because the FDA never ap-
proved Thalidomide for use in the U.S., the country was spared from the terrible teratogenic side eﬀects
of the pregnancy-related drug.19 Nevertheless, the thousands of birth defects caused by Thalidomide use
in Europe prompted further public demands for an expansion of the FDA’s power to protect consumers.20
The Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the FDCA substantially bolstered the FDA’s authority in a number
of ways. Pharmaceutical manufacturers were now required to submit “substantial evidence” proving both
the eﬀectiveness and safety of a new drug.21 The new eﬀectiveness requirement established the controlled
clinical trial as the standard for developing this empirical proof, and gave the FDA command over the de-
sign and structure of clinical trials by demanding speciﬁc types of scientiﬁc evidence.22 Additionally, the
15Id.
16Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1753, 1762 (1996).
17Richard M. Goodman & Paul D. Rheingold, Lawyer’s Drug Handbook 30 (1967).
18Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. § § 301-81
(1994)); see also Merrill, supra note 16, at 1764-65.
19Id.
20Id.
21Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.
Rev. 215, 218-19 (1999).
22See Greenberg, supra note 2 (1999), at 304; see also Merrill, supra note 16, at 1766.
6Kefauver-Harris Amendments extended the FDA’s approval timeframe from 60 to 180 days, and in contrast
to the FDCA, required aﬃrmative approval by the FDA before a drug could enter the market.23 These
Amendments from 1962 not only gave the FDA ultimate authority over drug approvals, but also established
many of the FDA’s standard approval processes that exist today.
B. The FDA’s Standard New Drug Approval Process
Since the passage of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, the FDA has enforced a careful, drawn-out, multi-
stage drug approval process for most new drugs. The process begins with a drug researcher engaging in
pre-clinical testing on animals to determine if a drug is suﬃciently safe and promising to risk clinical testing
on humans.24 Most estimates ﬁnd that pre-clinical testing can last at least thirty months.25 Following the
conclusion of animal testing, the FDA’s involvement typically begins when the drug researcher submits an
Investigational New Drug Application (IND) to obtain permission to begin human clinical trials.26 The IND
includes disclosure of all active ingredients of the new drug, a review of any previous human experience with
the drug, an overview of the entire investigation plan, a list of possible risks and side eﬀects, and a summary
of the toxicity and pharmacology results of the animal testing.27 If the FDA approves the IND, the drug
researcher can begin conducting Phase I clinical trials.
23See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 303-04 (citing Note, Drug Eﬃcacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 Geo. L.J. 185,
192-95 (1972)).
24Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives
on Private Certiﬁcation and Tort Reform, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 883, 905 (1996).
25Id. at 904-05 & nn.75-78.
2621 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2001).
27Id.
7Phase I clinical trials, which generally last about six months, involve testing of the experimental drug with
a group of twenty to eighty volunteers.28 The main purpose of Phase I testing is to generate safety and
pharmacological information of the drug’s use in humans.29 Assuming there are no major toxicities or
adverse side eﬀects in Phase I, a drug researcher can proceed with Phase II clinical testing. While Phase I
trials are primarily focused on establishing safety data, Phase II trials seek to determine data on eﬃcacy,
safety, and short-term tolerability of the drug in small groups of subjects who are inﬂicted with the disease
or condition the new drug is intended to treat.30 Even though Phase II testing involves controlled trials
designed to determine eﬃcacy, the results of the trials may not in and of themselves establish statistically
sound proof of eﬀectiveness due to the small number of trial subjects.31 Other Phase II study objectives
include determining the minimum dose that is maximally eﬀective, or that is suﬃciently eﬀective without
undue toxicity.32
If Phase II data produces reasonable evidence of a drug’s safety and eﬃcacy, the drug researcher can proceed
with arguably the most important clinical trials with Phase III testing. Phase III studies are large-scale,
controlled clinical trials typically involving anywhere from a hundred to several thousand subjects.33 The
primary aim of these trials is to conﬁrm eﬃcacy and long-term safety in the administration of the new drug
under circumstances closely resembling those under which the drug would be used if approved.34 In gathering
additional information about eﬃcacy and tolerability, the drug researcher seeks to identify the overall risk-
beneﬁt relationship of the drug and create an adequate evidentiary basis for dosage and labeling. From a
28James T. Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 Fla. J. Int’l L. 261, 335 (2002).
29Id. Phase I trial volunteers are generally tested for the safe dosage level of the drug, tolerance to the drug, administration
of the drug, and how the drug is eliminated from the body.
3021 C.F.R. § 312.21 (1999).
31See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 305.
32Id.
33From Test Tube to Patient: New Drug Development in the United States, FDA Consumer, Nov. 1987, at 12-15.
34See Gathii, supra note 28, at 336.
8pharmaceutical company’s perspective, success in Phase III trials produces safety and eﬃcacy data required
to fulﬁll statutory and regulatory obligations for approval and commercialization.35 Following the completion
of all necessary clinical trials, a pharmaceutical company can enter the pre-registration period and submit
a NDA to the FDA seeking marketing approval for the new drug.36 Submitting a NDA requires a great
deal of information, including all the data collected during the pre-clinical and clinical phases establishing
safety and eﬃcacy, the complete ingredients of the drug, the composition of the drug, a description of the
manufacturing, processing, and packaging methods, and samples of the drug and its proposed label.37 The
NDA approval process can take anywhere from several months to a few years before the FDA decides to
allow a new drug to enter the marketplace.38
The standard pre-approval process is a lengthy and expensive endeavor that reﬂects the risk-averse, consumer
protection origins of the FDCA and the Kefauver-Harris Amendments. The average time it takes for a new
drug to go through the three phases of clinical testing is approximately ﬁve years, but can range anywhere
from two to ten years.39 A Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development (CSDD) report ﬁnds
that on average, the time between starting research on a new drug and ultimately receiving FDA approval
ranges between ten and ﬁfteen years, and that during that timeframe, a pharmaceutical developer spends on
average $802 million.40 Following approval, the FDA can add further burdens to a pharmaceutical company
by conditioning approval on the success of Phase IV post-marketing studies.41 Based on those studies, the
35See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 305.
36See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 24, at 905 n.79.
37Id. at 908; see also 21 C.F.R. § § 314.50-.90 (2001).
38Melissa M. Bean, Fatal Flaws In the Food and Drug Administration’s Drug-Approval Formula, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 881,
885-86 (2003).
39See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 24, at 905 n.79
40Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development, BACKGROUNDER: How New Drugs Move through the De-
velopment and Approval Process, Nov. 1, 2001. Available at: http://csdd.tufts.edu/ NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=4.
41See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 24, at 914 n.126.
9FDA may withdraw its approval if a drug seems unsafe, ineﬀective or if safer alternatives enter the market.42
As a result of this diligent and complex process the FDA has been perceived as one of the safest and most
eﬀective regulatory agencies, but also one that may be too risk-averse and slow.43
C. AIDS and Expanded Access
Even before the emergence of the AIDS epidemic, critics of the FDA approval process were outspoken in
their condemnation of the agency for being too conservative in approving drugs used to treat life-threatening
diseases.44 Michael Greenberg, in his analysis of the FDA’s new drug screening process prior to and after
the AIDS epidemic, highlights the cancer therapy Laetrile as a prime example of the tensions between the
FDA’s restrictive policy and the autonomy of desperate patients.45 During the 1970s, many cancer patients
believed Laetrile, a drug with no controlled eﬃcacy data, was an eﬀective cancer therapy.46 Despite ample
protest by cancer patients and Laetrile advocates, the FDA refused to approve the drug without any clinical
trial data supporting safety and eﬀectiveness.47 Undeterred, a group of cancer patients brought suit against
the FDA to enjoin the agency’s interference in the interstate trade of the drug.48 Unfortunately, the U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the FDA’s authority and refused to make an exception to FDA approval
requirements for drugs used to treat terminally ill conditions.49 However, while the FDA remained adamant
in enforcing its restrictive approval regulations, the agency did begin to recognize a need to expedite the
42Id. at 914 n.125 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1994)).
43See Bean, supra note 38, at 883; see also Cray, supra note 2, at 109.
44Id; see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 306-07.
45Id.
46Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 557-59 (2d ed. 1991).
47Id.
48United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979); see also Kathryn A. Piﬀat, Liability for Injuries Caused by Unapproved
Pharmaceuticals Marketed to U.S. Consumers Abroad, 7 B.U. Int’l L.J. 155, 167-71 (1989).
49Id.
10availability of drugs for terminally ill patients with little to no alternative treatments.
In 1977, the FDA attempted to expand access to critical, life-saving drugs by implementing a compassionate
use IND.50 Although the FDA never formalized the compassionate use IND through administrative rule-
making, the informal exemption permitted physicians to prescribe an experimental drug to a patient with
a severe illness even if it was not for the purpose of clinical investigation.51 While the compassionate use
IND oﬀered new hope to those with life-threatening diseases, several barriers prevented the widespread use
of the exemption. First, the compassionate use IND was only oﬀered on a case-by-case basis and required
signiﬁcant time and eﬀort from a patient’s physician to petition the FDA.52 Second, even if a physician
went through the bureaucratic hurdles to submit a compassionate use IND, there was no guarantee the FDA
would approve the exemption.53 Third, even with FDA approval to the exemption, drug companies were
wary of participating because they were required to provide the experimental treatment free of charge.54 As
a result, the FDA’s initial attempt at expanding access and moving away from its conservative stance was
mostly deemed a failure.55
Another piecemeal attempt at allowing greater access to life-saving drugs was the FDA’s introduction of the
50Ken Flieger, FDA Finds New Ways to Speed Treatments to Patients, FDA Consumer Magazine, Oct. 1993.
51Id.; see also Frank E. Young, John S. Norris, Joseph A. Levitt, & Stuart L. Nightingale, The FDA’s New Procedures for
the Use of Investigation Drugs for Treatment, Journal of the American Medical Association, Apr. 15, 1998, at 2267. The FDA
has a long history of informally approving compassionate use INDs for individuals with life-threatening conditions who are
ineligible for ongoing clinical trials and unresponsive to existing treatments. The FDA also has an emergency IND provision
that allows the distribution of a drug for a speciﬁc use prior to ﬁling of an IND.
52Peter S. Arno & Karyn L. Feiden, Against the Odds: The Story of AIDS Drug Development, Politics and Proﬁts 34-35
(1992).
53Id.
54Lisa Terrizzi, The Need for Improved Access to Experimental Drug Therapy: AIDS Activists and Their Call for a Parallel
Track Policy, 4 Admin. L.J. 589, 600-01 n.62 (1991).
55See Flieger, supra note 50; see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 316.
11personal use import exemption in 1989.56 The exemption allows individuals in the U.S. to import limited
quantities of unapproved drugs for their personal use.57 While the program was originally intended for AIDS
and cancer patients, it currently covers many diﬀerent drugs.58 Although the exemption helped remedy sit-
uations for patients who could aﬀord expensive imported drugs, critics complained that the program favored
the wealthy, created greater potential for the exploitation of the seriously ill, and provided a disincentive
for terminally ill patients to participate in clinical trials for potentially eﬀective drugs.59 The personal use
import exemption did provide seriously ill patients expanded access to unapproved medicines, but it did
nothing to hasten the approval of life-saving therapies in the United States.
Compassionate use INDs and the personal import use exemption were important ﬁrst eﬀorts to expand
access, but did little to change the FDA’s slow, cumbersome approval processes. Major changes to the FDA’s
drug approval regulations did not occur until the onset of the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s. Compared to
patients aﬄicted with other conditions, the ﬁrst AIDS patients faced imminent death from a mysterious new
disease and had an almost complete lack of treatment options.60 This desperation forced AIDS patients to
resort to self-treatment using untested and unapproved drugs, and a powerful and vocal activist community
mounted escalating pressure on the FDA to reform the drug approval process to speed the development
and distribution of AIDS therapies.61 In conjunction with a strong community of cancer activists, AIDS
56Audrey A. Hale, The FDA’s Mail Import Policy: A Questionable Response to the AIDS Epidemic, 16 Rutgers Computer
& Tech. L.J. 169, 180-94 (1990).
57Id. at 180-81.
58Id. at 169-170, 180.
59See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 316-17; see also Myers, supra note 13, at 309-10.
60See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 311.
61Philip J. Hilts, How the AIDS Crisis Made Regulators Speed Up, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1989, at
D5; see also David Kessler, IOM 25th Anniversary Lecture, Seattle, WA, Nov. 7, 1994. Available at:
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/SPEECH/SPE00056.htm. Kessler, a former FDA commissioner noted that “AIDS activists
were literally scaling the walls of the FDA building...demanding access to potential therapies that had barely moved out of the
test tube.”
12activists were the primary drivers behind a slew of reforms to the FDA’s approval processes from the late
1980s through the 1990s.62
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant FDA response to pressure from the AIDS community came in 1987 with the introduction
of the treatment IND.63 The treatment IND was an expansion and formal codiﬁcation of the compassionate
use IND, and it attempted to rectify some of the problems that led to the failure of its predecessor. Rather
than being applied on a case-by-case basis, treatment INDs permit a promising experimental treatment
to be provided to a population of seriously ill patients while concurrent research and testing of the drug is
conducted under the standard FDA approval process.64 In addressing the commercial disincentive to provide
experimental drugs for free, treatment INDs allow drug companies to petition the FDA for authorization
to charge patients for experimental treatments.65 Although this raises the potential for drug companies to
abuse patients by charging extremely high prices, the FDA’s decision-making power over the petition allows
the agency to create some commercial incentive while simultaneously checking possible extortion.66 In terms
of who can apply for the exemption, the FDA assumed drug companies would be the primary drivers of
submitting treatment IND requests, but the exemption also allows physicians to apply for a treatment IND
when a drug company has yet to do so.67
62Id.; see also Julie Rovner, FDA Speeds Up Some Approval Procedures, 347 Lancet 1038 (1996).
63See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (1999); see also Ellen C. Cooper, Changes in Normal Drug Approval Process in Response to the
AIDS Crisis, 45 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 329, 333 (1990).
64Id. Treatment INDs become available when the experimental drug is intended to treat a serious or life-threatening disease,
there are no satisfactory treatment alternatives for the target disease and patient population, the drug is already being researched
through controlled trials pursuant to an IND or has completed that research, and the sponsor of the IND is pursuing marketing
approval for the experimental drug with due diligence.
65See 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(2) (1999).
66See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 320; see also Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 505. Companies can bill patients
to recover the costs of a distributed treatment IND drug, but the amount cannot exceed the manufacturing, research and
development, and distribution costs.
67See 21 C.F.R. § 312.35 (1999). The FDA also had considerable freedom to deem a treatment IND as submitted whenever
it found it to be appropriate.
13Despite the improvements over the compassionate use IND, the treatment IND has endured criticism by
activists that the exception does too little in getting experimental drugs to desperate patients.68 The FDA
still wields a great degree of authority in determining when treatment IND drugs can become available,
and generally, the regulations make it diﬃcult for experimental drugs to be distributed prior to entering
Phase III trials.69 In order for an experimental drug to be available prior to Phase III trials, the FDA must
determine that the drug could be reasonably eﬀective in treating an “immediately life-threatening” condition
without signiﬁcant risks of harm to patients.70 Experimental drugs that merely treat “serious” conditions
are generally unavailable until Phase III trials, assuming all other treatment IND requirements are met.71
Because experimental drugs can at best become available in Phase II, and most drugs are not likely to be
available until Phase III, treatment INDs only marginally expand access of life-saving therapies to market.72
Combined with the concerns regarding payment and reimbursement for the experimental drugs, the minimal
acceleration provided by treatment INDs was insuﬃcient to quell the voices of AIDS activists.73
Five years after the introduction of treatment INDs, the FDA sought to expand early availability of experi-
mental AIDS treatments through the parallel track initiative.74 Going beyond the parameters of treatment
68See Arno & Feiden, supra note 52, at 101-02.
69See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (1999).
70See id. (deﬁning immediately life-threatening as stage of disease in which there is a reasonable likelihood that death will
occur within a matter of months or in which premature death is likely without early treatment.).
71See id. (noting that “serious” was not deﬁned under the regulation, providing the FDA with considerable latitude in
evaluating treatment INDs for “serious” conditions).
72See Terrizzi, supra note 54, at 608-10. See also Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 507-09. Excluding treatment IND
drugs that received accelerated approval, treatment IND drugs in fact had a longer regulatory phase than non-treatment INDs
from 1987-1994. Perhaps treatment IND drugs are inherently more likely to receive accelerated approval, and they appeared
to have shorter FDA review times due to increased data accumulation and earlier FDA involvement, but the ultimate eﬀect of
treatment INDs on accelerating marketing approval is inconclusive.
73See Arno & Feiden, supra note 52, at 101-02.
74Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track Mechanism for People with AIDS and other
HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (1992).
14INDs, the parallel track program makes experimental AIDS drugs available “when the evidence for eﬀec-
tiveness is less than generally required for a treatment IND,” which can be as early as the end of Phase I,
provided that Phase II trials have begun enrollment.75 The parallel track initiative is exclusively designed
for drugs treating AIDS or HIV-related conditions, and is aimed towards expanding access to patients who
are unable to participate in ongoing clinical trials.76 In balancing the lower level of required safety and
eﬃcacy evidence, parallel track requires all physicians to ﬁle safety reports and features enhanced oversight
by the National Institutes of Health AIDS Research Advisory Committee.77
With the advent of other FDA procedures for expanding and expediting drug development, the parallel track
initiative has gone from minimally used to nearly obsolete.78 The higher risk level assumed by patients of
parallel track drugs and wariness by sponsors over ﬁnancial issues in providing the drugs led to the infrequent
use of the initiative.79 Drug companies are allowed to charge for parallel track drugs, but they must obtain
prior authorization from the FDA, further exacerbating similar ﬁnancial worries associated with treatment
INDs.80 If a drug company cannot obtain reimbursement for a parallel track drug, then the large number
of potential patients and necessary levels of inventories of the drug create legitimate cost concerns for any
sponsor. As a result, only one experimental AIDS drug has been made available using the parallel track
initiative.81
75Id. at 13,256; see also Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 509.
76Id.
77Id. Data gathered from parallel track studies can be used to corroborate clinical trial data, but because parallel track drugs
are not used in controlled trials, the supporting data is mostly useful for conﬁrming safety.
78See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 327.
79Id. at 325-27.
8021 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(1). The sponsor must show why the trial or distribution cannot proceed without charging patients for
the drug. The sponsor cannot charge an amount greater than the manufacturing, research and development, and distribution
costs of the drug.
81See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 327.
15D. Expediting Drug Approvals
Even though treatment INDs and the parallel track initiative did little to ultimately expedite drug approvals,
their inception showed the FDA’s willingness to soften its conservative stance and adjust risk-beneﬁt analyses
based on speciﬁc, seriously ill patient groups. Starting in the early 1990s, the FDA made substantial eﬀorts
to get new drugs to market faster. These new, codiﬁed regulations represented signiﬁcant achievements
after years of political pressure from AIDS and cancer activists, and they were partially based on regulatory
innovations used in the mid 1980s to speed the approval of the AIDS drug azidothymidine (AZT).82
The expedited development regulations, commonly known as the “Subpart E” regulations, represent several
established FDA processes that were ﬁnally codiﬁed in 1992.83 The goal of the Subpart E regulations is
to accelerate the development and approval of drugs used to treat life-threatening and severely debilitating
diseases.84 From a technical standpoint, the acceleration through the development stage is accomplished
through a more collaborative arrangement between the drug researcher and the FDA.85 By applying the
“coherent whole” model used in approving AZT, the regulations embrace a policy where “interventions at
one stage are designed to lead to eﬃciencies in the next.”86 As a result, the Subpart E framework features
early and frequent consultations between the drug researcher and the FDA in the design of clinical trials in
order to ensure that the outcomes will be useful in meeting subsequent approval requirements.87 In addition
82See Arno & Feiden, supra note 52, at 41-46
83Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended To Treat
Life-Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,516, 41,523 (1998); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.80 (1999).
84Id.
8521 C.F.R. § 312.82 (1999) (early consultation between drug researchers and the FDA); 21 C.F.R. § 312.87 (1999) (ongoing
FDA monitoring of clinical trials).
86Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 511 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,516).
87See 21 C.F.R. § 312.82 and 21 C.F.R. § 312.87.
16to ongoing monitoring of clinical trials by the FDA, a drug researcher can request a conference with the FDA
at the end of Phase I to eﬀectively design an expanded, multi-center Phase II study.88 Based on the success
of the expanded Phase II study, the regulations allow a drug company the opportunity to forego Phase III
trials and submit a NDA at the end of Phase II.89 The regulations also authorize post-marketing studies, or
Phase IV studies, which allow promising experimental drugs to reach the market faster and then continue
conﬁrmatory research after approval.90
In addition to the procedural eﬃciencies introduced by the regulations, Subpart E drugs are evaluated with
a modiﬁed risk-beneﬁt analysis. First, the regulations speciﬁcally include the severity of the disease and lack
of alternative treatments in the FDA’s evaluation of a Subpart E drug’s approval.91 Second, in recognizing
the higher risk tolerance of desperate, seriously ill patients, the regulations adopt a more ﬂexible application
of the FDA’s conservative safety and eﬀectiveness standards.92 This modiﬁed risk-beneﬁt evaluation coupled
with intensive collaboration between drug researchers and the FDA signiﬁcantly shortened the time to market
for life-saving drugs which qualiﬁed under Subpart E regulations.93
The same year as the Subpart E regulations were codiﬁed, the FDA substantially shortened approval review
times for all drugs by implementing the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (PDUFA).94 In responding
to constant criticism about the slow, cumbersome drug approval process, the FDA frequently claimed that
88Id.; see also Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 512.
89Id.
9021 C.F.R. § 312.85 (1999).
91See 21 C.F.R. § 312.80.
92Id.
93See Shulman & Brown, supra note 5, at 513-14. In an analysis of the 28 Subpart E approvals between 1988 and 1994,
Subpart E drugs had a shorter average total development time of 7.5 years.
94Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Pub. L. No. 102-571, § 101, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992).
17reviewing NDAs took an extended period of time due to the agency’s budget constraints and the inability
to hire more reviewers.95 The PDUFA sought to address this concern by levying fees on pharmaceutical
companies to ﬁnance the hiring of additional reviewers.96 Under the PDUFA, the FDA can collect user fees
from drug companies who ﬁle NDAs, companies who market approved prescription drugs, and owners of
retail prescription drug stores.97 While the PDUFA has raised questions about the ﬁnancial relationship
between pharmaceutical companies and the agency that regulates them, the Act has allowed the FDA to
substantially increase its workforce and reduce the agency’s review times.98 The PDUFA was only authorized
for ﬁve years, but was subsequently extended under the FDA Modernization Act in 1997.99
In 1993, the FDA formally enacted perhaps the most signiﬁcant initiative to expedite drug approvals, the
accelerated approval, or Subpart H regulations.100 While Subparts E and H are both directed at drugs that
address similar conditions, accelerated approval is markedly diﬀerent in the standards used to evaluate an
experimental drug’s NDA.101 The FDA standard for regulatory approval is typically convincing evidence
of a clinical beneﬁt (i.e. prolonged survival or increased quality of life) in a controlled Phase III trial.102
Accelerated approval standards radically depart from the traditional evidentiary standards and provisional
approval can be granted based on evidence of a surrogate measure of clinical beneﬁt (i.e. tumor shrinkage) in
a single, uncontrolled clinical trial.103 In order for an experimental drug to be approved based on a surrogate
95See Merrill, supra note 16, at 1798.
96John Henkel, User Fees To Fund Faster Reviews, FDA Consumer, Oct. 1993, at 19.
97See Prescription Drug User Fee Act § 736, 106 Stat. at 4494-6.
98See Bean, supra note 38, at 910; see also Parver, supra note 4, at 1264-65; Julie Rovner, Once Controversial U.S. FDA-
Overhaul Bill Advances, 350 Lancet 1153, 1153 (1997); Jocelyn Kaiser, Regulatory Agencies: FDA Reform Starts Down the
Track, Science, Mar. 1, 1996, at 1228.
99FDA Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 101, 111 Stat. 2296, 2296-2305.
10021 C.F.R. § 314.500 (1999) (accelerated approval of drugs); 21 C.F.R. § 601.4 (1999) (accelerated approval of biologics).
101Id.; Subpart E regulations refer to life-threatening and severely debilitating illnesses, 21 C.F.R. § 312.80, while accelerated
approval regulations refer to serious or immediately life-threatening illnesses 21 C.F.R. § § 314.500, 601.40.
102See Roberts and Chabner, supra note 6 at 502.
103Id.; see also David M. Cocchetto and Douglas R. Jones, Faster Access to Drugs for Serious or Life-Threatening Illnesses
Through Use of the Accelerated Approval Regulation in the United States, Drug Information Journal, Feb. 15, 1998, at 29. In
18endpoint, the surrogate measure must be reasonably predictive of a clinical beneﬁt and the drug must oﬀer
a meaningful therapeutic beneﬁt over existing alternative treatments.104 For accelerated approval, a drug
company is not required to show a direct, validated link between the surrogate measure and clinical beneﬁt,
and in fact, if that link is already ﬁrmly established, then the drug may have to be evaluated under standard
procedures or Subpart E.105 Because of the uncertainty associated with surrogate endpoints, accelerated
approval is granted conditionally, and the drug manufacturer must conduct conﬁrmatory Phase IV trials
following approval.106 Generally, the FDA expects that these conﬁrmatory studies will be underway at the
time of accelerated approval, but this is not a requirement.107 Based on the results of the Phase IV trials,
the FDA can choose to withdraw the drug from the market.108 By approving drugs based on intermediate,
but predictive endpoints, and mandating conﬁrmatory research after approval, the FDA can use the Subpart
H regulations to substantially shorten pre-approval development and review times.
E. The FDA Modernization Act and the Fast-Track Programs
The FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) was a comprehensive statute aimed at reforming a multitude
of processes within the FDA.109 Among the changes brought on by the FDAMA, the provisions that codiﬁed
March 1996, President Clinton announced an initiative entitled “Reinventing the Regulation of Cancer Drugs” which led the
FDA to expand use of accelerated approval processes for cancer treatments by basing approvals on surrogate endpoints like
tumor shrinkage instead of more traditional endpoints.
104See Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 514.
105Id.
106Id. at 514-15. The FDA can also add further conditions to accelerated approval in order to compensate for safety and
eﬃcacy concerns, including restricted distribution, advance review of advertising, and a streamlined procedure withdrawal of
the drug.
107Ramzi Dagher et al., Accelerated Approval of Oncology Products: A Decade of Experience, Journal of the National Cancer
Institute, Oct. 20, 2004, at 1500.
108Id.
109FDA Modernization Act § 101, 111 Stat. at 2296; see also Parver, supra note 4, at 1249. The FDAMA covers foods,
drugs, and medical devices, and has generic provisions that apply to all parts of the FDA. Additionally, the FDAMA includes
regulations on the research, manufacturing, and marketing of new drugs, including authorization to market oﬀ-label uses for
drugs.
19and expanded the incremental reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s truly demonstrated the FDA’s desire
to adapt and react to legitimate public health issues and political pressure. At a policy level, one goal of the
FDAMA was to improve the “historically adversarial relationship between pharmaceutical companies and
the FDA.”110 By reinstating the PDUFA’s user fee scheme as well as improving mechanisms for interactions
between pharmaceutical companies and agency oﬃcials at a variety of levels, the FDAMA creates a more
cooperative environment that raises the potential for speedier drug development and approval.111
In terms of expediting drug approvals, the most signiﬁcant aspect of the FDAMA was the consolidation
and codiﬁcation of a variety of incremental approval reforms into a comprehensive fast-track development
program.112 The fast-track program is designed to facilitate clinical development and expedite review of
new drug or biological products intended to treat serious or life-threatening conditions and that demonstrate
the potential to address unmet needs for new therapy.113 A pharmaceutical company can apply for fast-
track designation for any product, but the product and the speciﬁc indication for which it is being studied
must meet the qualifying “life-threatening” and “unmet need” criteria. Pharmaceutical companies can begin
discussing fast-track designation with the FDA as early as the pre-IND meeting, and the designation can
be applied when an IND is submitted.114 The FDA attempts to respond to fast-track designation requests
110Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS,
and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 93, 121 (1999).
111See FDA Modernization Act § § 101-07, 111 Stat. at 2298-2305; see also Parver, supra note 4, at 1259-1261. The FDA
established meeting management goals to ensure prompt scheduling and responses, major dispute resolution procedures with
shorter deadlines, technology enhancements, and other improvements designed to improve the interaction between the FDA
and pharmaceutical companies.
112See Milne and Bergman, supra note 5, at 71-72. Prior to the passage of the FDAMA, “fast-track” meant many things to
many people, including Subpart E, Subpart H, rolling NDAs, “priority” status under the PDUFA, and even treatment INDs and
parallel track. The FDA has explicitly said expanded access programs such as treatment INDs are distinct from the fast-track
program.
113FDA Guidance for Industry, Fast Track Drug Development Programs - Designation, Development, and Application Re-
view, Procedural Revision 1, July 2004. Available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/ 5645fnl.htm (hereinafter Fast-Track
guidance).
114Id. at 8.
20within sixty days of submission.115
Much like the procedural goals of the Subpart E regulations, the fast-track program seeks to facilitate clinical
development in a variety of ways. First, fast-track regulations provide for early and regular consultations
between the FDA and the new drug’s sponsor; especially at key points in the clinical developments process
such as pre-IND, end of Phase I, end of Phase II, pre-NDA, and early in the labeling process.116 Second,
the fast-track guidelines speciﬁcally outline the sponsor’s responsibility of providing important written cor-
respondence to the FDA, and also the FDA’s responsibility to deliver timely comments on the design of the
principle controlled clinical trials and the suﬃciency of the sponsor’s Phase II and III development plans.117
Third, fast-track sponsors have formal dispute resolution and escalation procedures to appeal FDA decisions
falling under the fast-track program.118 The formalized procedural mechanisms that come with fast-track
designation attempt to reduce clinical development time by introducing early cooperation, enhanced pre-
dictability of FDA decision-making, and eﬃcient agency interventions.
The fast-track program oﬀers two procedures that can signiﬁcantly reduce the time it takes for the FDA to
evaluate a NDA. Fast-track designation does not guarantee any of these review-expediting procedures, but
based on the medical need for fast-track products, they are likely to be considered for at least one of them.119
First, fast-track designation means that the product “ordinarily will be eligible for priority review.”120 A
“standard” NDA review sets the target date for completing all aspects of the review and the FDA’s approval





119See Roberts & Chabner, supra note 6, at 502.
120Id.
121Center for Drug Evaluation and Research Manual of Policies and Procedures, MaPP 6020.3, Priority Review Policy, April
22, 1996; Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research Manual of Standard Operating Procedures and Policies, SOPP 8405,
Complete Review and Issuance of Action Letters, June 11, 1998.
21FDA decision at six months.122 Second, the fast-track program allows for a “rolling review” of portions of
a NDA before the full application is submitted.123 The FDA can then review the NDA as the completed
sections are submitted rather than waiting until the entire application arrives for evaluation. In terms of
expediting clinical development and review time, fast-track products can also be considered for accelerated
approval under the previously enacted Subpart H regulations.124
The FDAMA formally established the three main procedures currently used to expedite drugs to market.
Fast-track designation is a formal mechanism of interaction between a drug company and the FDA that
reduces ineﬃciencies in clinical development and NDA review. Priority review oﬀers the beneﬁt of a four-
month reduction of the time it takes for the FDA to evaluate a NDA. Accelerated approval primarily
deals with the design and content of the studies used to support a marketing claim and can signiﬁcantly
speed a drug to market using surrogate endpoints for conditional approval. Fast-track designation does not
necessarily lead to a priority review or accelerated approval, and an applicant can apply to use any element
of the fast-track programs without receiving fast-track designation.125 The FDA is currently conducting its
own pilot programs with fast-track designated products to assess the added value, costs, and impact of more
extensive feedback during drug development and rolling review of NDAs.126
122Id.
123Fast-Track Guidance, supra note 113, at 12-14. The FDA will allow a “rolling review” if (1) the clinical trials that would
form the basis for the FDA’s determination of the safety and eﬀectiveness of the product and that would support drug labeling
are nearing completion or have been completed, (2) the FDA agrees that the product continues to meet the criteria for fast
track designation, and (3) the FDA agrees that preliminary evaluation of the clinical data supports a determination that the
product may be eﬀective.
124Id. at 14-15.
125Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “Fast Track, Priority Review and Accelerated Approval”, updated Apr. 26, 2005.
Available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/onctools/Accel.cfm (hereinafter Oncology Tools Expedited Products).
126Draft Guidance for Industry Continuous Marketing Applications: Pilot 1 – Reviewable Units for Fast Track Products Under
PDUFA, June 2003, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5207dft.pdf; Draft Guidance for Industry Continuous
Marketing Applications: Pilot 2 – Scientiﬁc Feedback and Interactions During Development of Fast Track Products Under
PDUFA, June 2003, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/5208dft.pdf.
22Section II. Analyzing the Success of Accelerated Approvals and Fast-Track
During the past decade and a half, the FDA reformed drug approval processes to allow faster introductions of
drugs primarily for desperate patients with life-threatening diseases. Accelerated approval and the fast-track
program are the most commonly used mechanisms to expedite drugs to market, and both procedures have
likely saved or improved countless lives.127 However, while accelerated approval gained immediate praise for
reducing time to market for important new therapies, the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA have yet to
fully quantify and recognize the beneﬁts of the fast-track program.128 The early acceptance of accelerated
approval was based on the seemingly obvious advantages of using surrogate endpoints to signiﬁcantly reduce
clinical development timeframes.129
A. Accelerated Approval
The ﬁrst analysis of accelerated approvals, published two years after the formal implementation of Subpart
H, clearly demonstrated the virtue of the program.130 By the end of 1994, eight drugs and supplemental
applications had received accelerated approval under Subpart H (3 new chemical entities, 2 biotechnology
products, and 3 eﬃcacy supplements for already approved drugs), with ﬁve of the approvals intended for the
treatment of AIDS and HIV-related diseases.131 On average, the clinical development time for the ﬁve newly
127See Tufts CSDD Fast-Track Study, supra note 5, at 2.
128See Milne and Bergman, supra note 5, at 72-73; see also Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 516.
129Id.
130Id.
131Id.; see also FDA New Drug Approval Report “NDA Approvals Under Subpart H”, updated Mar. 31, 2005 (hereinafter
“Accelerated Approvals - NDAs”). Available at: http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/ accappr.htm; FDA New Drug Approval
Report “NDA Supplements Approved Under Subpart H”, updated Mar. 31, 2005 (hereinafter “Accelerated Approvals – NDA
Supplements”). Available at: http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/accappr1.htm; FDA New Drug Approval Report “Biological
23approved drugs was 4.2 years; a substantial decrease from the average ten to ﬁfteen year clinical development
time for most other new drugs.132 Additionally, the average FDA review period for all eight Subpart H
approvals was 9.1 months, with an average 8.4 months of review time for the ﬁve newly approved drugs.133
Compared to standard median FDA review times in 1993 and 1994 of nearly two years, the review process
for Subpart H drugs was truly accelerated.134 Another study examining accelerated approvals between 1992
and 1997 showed that the Subpart H regulations enabled twenty drugs to reach patients at least one or two
years earlier than would have been possible otherwise.135 Although Subpart H regulations were primarily
intended for AIDS treatments, products receiving accelerated approval in the early years of the regulations
also included cancer treatments (especially after the Cancer Drug Initiative of 1996), as well as drugs for
multiple sclerosis, cystic ﬁbrosis, and mycobacterial infections.136
The success of the accelerated approval regulations has continued since its codiﬁcation in early 1993. Since
then, the FDA has granted accelerated approval to over sixty distinct drugs or biologics.137 Of the eighteen
drugs approved to treat patients infected with HIV, sixteen of them were expedited to market under Subpart
H.138 The average review time for these AIDS treatments was less than six months.139 Since the ﬁrst cancer
Products Approved Under Subpart E”, updated Mar. 31, 2005 (hereinafter “Accelerated Approvals – Biologics”). Available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/BIOAPPR.htm.
132See Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 515; see also Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development, supra
note 5, at 1.
133See Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 515.
134See FDA New Drug Approval Report “CDER Approval Times for Priority and Standard NMEs and New BLAs Cal-
endar Years 1993 – 2004”, updated Mar. 22, 2005 (hereinafter “NME/New BLA Approval Times”). Available at:
http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/NMEapps93-04.htm; FDA New Drug Approval Report “Approval Times for Priority and Stan-
dard NDAs and BLAs Calendar Years 1993 – 2004”, updated Mar. 22, 2005 (hereinafter “NDA/BLA Approval Times”).
Available at: http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/ NDAapps93-04.htm. In 1993, median approval time for a new molecular entity
(NME)/new biologic was 14.9 months for priority designations and 27.2 months for standard designations; median approval
time for a NDA/BLA was 20.5 months priority designations and 26.9 months for standard designations. In 1994, median
approval time for a new molecular entity (NME)/new biologic was 14.0 months for priority designations and 23.7 months
for standard designations; median approval time for a NDA/BLA was 14.0 months priority designations and 21.0 months for
standard designations.
135See Cocchetto and Jones, supra note 103, at 34.
136Id. at 29; see also Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 515.
137Calculations based on data from Accelerated Approvals – NDAs, Accelerated Approvals – NDA Supplements, and Ac-
celerated Approvals – Biologics, supra note 131. FDA Approval Reports indicate 87 accelerated approvals of NDAs, NDA
Supplements, BLAs, and BLA Supplements through March 2005. Of the 87 accelerated approvals, 60 distinct drugs or biologics
are represented.
138See Roberts and Chabner, supra note 6, at 502.
139Id.
24drug was granted accelerated approval in 1995, nearly a third of all approved cancer treatments have entered
the market via accelerated approval, with a median total development time 5.5 years shorter than cancer
drugs approved through standard mechanisms.140 On average, FDA review times for all drugs, biologics,
and supplemental applications under Subpart H have remained below nine months.141 In 2004, the median
approval time for an accelerated approval was approximately six months, while median approvals for standard
designated drugs and biologics ranged between 13 and 25 months.142 Some new drugs and supplemental
applications have even been approved under Subpart H in a matter of weeks.143 Over the past twelve years,
accelerated approvals have expanded beyond AIDS and cancer to account for treatments for a wide range
of diseases including hypertension, tuberculosis, and anthrax infection.144 Based on the reduction in clinical
development and approval times, the FDA appears to have reached its goals in enacting the accelerated
approval regulations. However, as seen in Section III of this paper, the Subpart H regulations have not been
without controversy.
B. Fast-Track Programs
Unlike accelerated approval, the fast-track program encountered early skepticism from the pharmaceutical
140Id.; see also Steven Hirschfeld et.al., Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Experience With the Accelerated Ap-
proval program for Oncology Products, Proc. Am. Soc. Clin. Oncol., Jun. 2003, at 520. Presentation available at:
http://media.asco.org/asco/meetings education/vm/2003/slides only/ slide.asp?id=3303&max=20.
141Calculations based on data from Accelerated Approvals – NDAs, Accelerated Approvals – NDA Supplements, and Accel-
erated Approvals – Biologics, supra note 131. Average approval time for NDAs under Subpart H was 8.9 months. Average
approval time for NDA Supplements under Subpart H was 6.1 months. Average approval time for BLAs and BLA Supplements
under Subpart H was 13.2 months.
142Calculations based on data from Accelerated Approvals – NDAs, Accelerated Approvals – NDA Supplements, and Accel-
erated Approvals – Biologics, supra note 131, and NME/New BLA Approval Times, NDA/BLA Approval Times, supra note
134.
143Id. For example, the NDA for Crixivan, an AIDS therapy, was approved in six weeks, a NDA supplement for Gleevec to
treat pediatric leukemia was approved in four weeks, and a NDA supplement for Levaquin as an oral solution to treat anthrax
was approved in two weeks.
144See Accelerated Approvals – NDAs, Accelerated Approvals – NDA Supplements, and Accelerated Approvals – Biologics,
supra note 131.
25industry and an undercurrent of doubt within the FDA. Despite earlier studies that demonstrated that pre-
IND meetings and end of Phase II meetings reduced clinical development time, the pharmaceutical industry
had trouble recognizing the value of the fast-track program over existing regulatory mechanisms and found
the program “soft and really not well-deﬁned.”145 Other industry specialists were wary of added bureaucracy
when they already had close working relationships with the FDA.146 Critics feared that fast-track designation
was merely a public relations device to showcase exciting new products, raise the hopes of desperate patient
populations, and boost the stock prices of small biotechnology companies who were ﬁnancially reliant on a
single fast-track product.147 Even within the FDA, senior oﬃcials questioned how the formalized fast-track
program would actually change how drugs were developed and evaluated from an agency standpoint because
many of the fast-track mechanisms were already in use prior to the passage of the FDAMA.148 The beneﬁts
of improved approval mechanisms such as “rolling review” were tempered with FDA guidance that actual
review may not commence until the agency’s receipt of the entire NDA/BLA.149
However, early analysis of the industry experience with the fast-track program, conducted by the Tufts
University CSDD, identiﬁed the potential advantages of the regulations.150 The study surveyed industry
participants in the fast-track program and found that many obtained some beneﬁt from formalized interac-
tions with the FDA.151 When asked which speciﬁc programs facilitated the beneﬁts of fast-track designation,
145Joseph A. DiMasi and Michael Mannochia, Initiatives to Speed New Drug Development and Regulatory
Review: The Impact of FDA-Sponsor Conferences, Drug Information Journal, Aug. 15, 1997, at 771; see also Milne and
Bergman, supra note 5, at 72 (quoting Another View on Industry Response to Fast Track Program, US Regulatory Reporter,
Sept. 1998, at 1.
146Id. (quoting Drug Industry Has Not Yet Embraced FDAMA’s “Fast Track” Program, US Regulatory Reporter, Aug. 1998,
at 1.
147Id.
148Id. (quoting An Interview with Director of the Division of Cardio-Renal Drug Products Raymond Lipicky, M.D., US
Regulatory Reporter, Oct. 1999, at 3; see also Lisa Piercey, Life in the Fast Lane, Signals Magazine, May 23, 2003 (available
at http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/0/ 665186CB53B22AAB88256D4D0053A050). John Jenkins, Director of the
Oﬃce of New Drugs at the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), noted that early cooperation with the FDA is
available outside of the fast-track program. “We don’t see that (Fast Track) does that much from the perspective of how we
interact with a company...If we think you have a product that has real potential to meet a medical need, we are not going to
base our decision to interact with you on whether you have Fast Track designation or not.”
149See Fast-Track Guidance, supra note 113, at 14.
150See generally Milne and Bergman, supra note 5, at 71.
151Id.
2687% of the respondents credited the meetings and correspondence with the FDA, with less than 50% giving
credit to the rolling review and accelerated approval mechanisms.152 When asked what operational factors
were responsible for the advantages of the fast-track program, 83% of respondents identiﬁed increased inter-
action with the FDA as an important factor, and 61% speciﬁcally lauded the increased face-to-face contact
with the agency.153 Compared to previously existing regulatory mechanisms, the fast-track regulations pro-
vided respondents with many more meetings at critical junctures in the clinical development process.154
Additionally, the study’s authors noted there must be some attractiveness to fast-track designation as more
fast-track applications were received in the one year since the FDA issued the guidance documents for the
FDAMA than there were for Subpart E or H approvals in the ten years prior to the FDAMA. 155
Notwithstanding the initial positive experiences with the fast-track system, the study left several questions
unanswered regarding the overall success or failure of the regulations. Although the fast-track system can
impact the entire development and approval life of a drug, the study’s authors stated it was too early
to determine the eﬀect of fast-track on reducing clinical development time.156 Additionally, while more
than 50% of respondents stated they experienced at least some advantages from fast-track designation,
39% responded that they were still waiting to see if they received any beneﬁts from use of the fast-track
programs.157 Early critics of the fast-track system, who claimed the regulations were primarily for public
relations purposes, were left with lingering concerns as 65% of respondents believed the publicity from
fast-track designation was at least partly responsible for the beneﬁts from the fast-track regulations.158
152Id. at 79.
153Id.
154Id. at 81. Survey respondents had 1.5 times as many meetings at the pre-IND stage, 4 times as many meetings after Phase
I, and 6 times as many meetings after Phase II.
155Id. at 74.
156Id. at 73.
157Id. at 79. Of the survey respondents, 9% said fast-track beneﬁted their product to a large extent, 30% said it beneﬁted
their product to some extent, 17% said it beneﬁted their product to a minimal extent, 39% said it was too early to tell if their
product beneﬁted, and 4% their product did not beneﬁt from fast-track designation.
158Id. Respondents rated increased publicity as the second highest operational factor responsible for the beneﬁts of the
27The performance record of the fast-track program indicates that the regulations have generally been success-
ful. Nearly ﬁfty drugs and supplemental applications have been approved under the fast-track program.159
Over the past ﬁve years, the FDA has approved new drugs and biologics receiving priority designation in
approximately six months, although 2002 had signiﬁcantly longer review times due to a few exceptional
cases.160 A Tufts University CSDD study from 2003 determined that the average clinical development time
for fast-track designated drugs was 2 to 2.5 years shorter compared to non-fast-track designated drugs, and
that average total development time, including approval review, was nearly three years shorter.161 In ad-
dition, average approval times for fast-track drugs were one-third the time of standard drug approvals and
half the time of priority drug approvals.162 However, the study found that while fast-track biologics had a
shorter approval time compared to standard and priority biologics, clinical development time was 1 to 1.5
years longer.163 The longer clinical development times for fast-track biologics may be explained by the small
sample size and the fact that less biologics compressed clinical development time using accelerated approval
mechanisms.164
Despite the apparent achievements of the fast-track system, legitimate concerns still remain as to the beneﬁts
and the long-term impact of the regulations. One major concern is whether the FDA has been too lenient
fast-track program.
159FDA New Drug Approval Report, Fast Track Designated Products Approved Since 1988, updated through Mar. 31, 2005
(hereinafter Fast-Track Approvals). Available at: http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/ internetftap.htm.
160See NME/New BLA Approval Times and NDA/BLA Approval Times, supra note 134; see also FDA Quickens Approval
Pace in 2003, Drug Store News, Feb. 16, 2004, at 35. The FDA attributed the 2002 priority approval times to the eﬀect of a
few applications with unusually long regulatory histories.
161See Tufts CSDD Fast-Track Study, supra note 5, at 2.
162Id.
163Id.
164Id. The biologics analysis was based on data for six of nine fast-track biologicals, with one product with an exceptionally
long development time.
28in granting fast-track designations. The FDA has publicly stated that the agency “loosely” interprets the
“serious and life-threatening” requirement for fast-track drugs in order to expedite therapies that may not
treat immediately life-threatening diseases such as diabetes.165 According to John Jenkins, director of the
Oﬃce of New Drugs at the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), the threshold for fast-
track qualiﬁcation is essentially a potential for eﬃcacy in treating an unmet medical need; a potential that
often “never materializes.”166 Based on this standard, the FDA has been somewhat generous in granting fast-
track designations. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2005, CDER granted fast-track designation to 53% of applicants,
and only denied designation to 20% of applicants.167 Historically, CDER has been even more liberal, and has
granted fast-track designation to nearly 70% of applicants from 1998 to mid-2003.168 From 1998 to March
2005, the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) has granted fast-track designation to 59%
of biologic applicants.169 Considering that the time it takes for most sponsors to prepare a fast-track request
is generally less than the initial FDA estimate of 40 to 80 hours, it comes as no surprise that pharmaceutical
companies pursue fast-track designation for as many drug candidates as possible.170 Many pharmaceutical
companies have used the “serious” condition standard to push for a broad range of fast-track designations,
thereby “[swinging] wide the regulatory door knocked ajar by the AIDS crisis.”171 Although no analysis
has been done as to the frivolity of fast-track applications, a more open deﬁnition of “serious” condition is
165Almost Five Years Later: Fast Track Record Slow to Form, The Food & Drug Letter, Jan. 18, 2002. Sandra Kweder, then
acting director of the Oﬃce of Review Management at CDER, stated that “fast track helps us achieve our public health mission”
by expediting drugs treating conditions with signiﬁcant morbidity and expanding the deﬁnition of an important therapeutic
advance to include diseases that aren’t necessarily treatments of “serious or life-threatening” conditions.
166See Piercey, supra note 148. Jenkins notes that fast-track designation can be based on animal testing in some cases.
167FDA New Drug Approval Report, CDER Response to Request for Fast Track Designation FY 2005, updated Mar. 31, 2005
(hereinafter CDER Fast-Track Response). Available at: http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/internetftstats.htm. As of March 31,
2005, 27% of fast-track requests for the ﬁscal year 2005 are still pending. The median FDA response for 2005 is 51 days; below
the FDA fast-track request response goal of 60 days.
168See Tufts CSDD Fast-Track Study, supra note 5, at 2.
169CBER Fast Track Designation Request Performance Report, updated Apr. 11, 2005 (hereinafter CBER Fast-Track Re-
sponse). Available at: http://www.fda.gov/cber/inside/fastrk.htm.
170See Milne and Bergman, supra note 5, at 76. 41% of respondents stated their fast-track request took 40 to 100 hours to
prepare, 35% stated it took 10 to 24 hours to prepare, and 24% stated it took 1 to 5 hours to prepare. The FDA estimated
that the preparation of a fast-track request would take 40 to 80 hours; see also Bean, supra note 38, at 887.
171David Willman, How a New Policy Led to Seven Deadly Drugs, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 2000, at A1 (quoting Jeﬀrey A.
Nesbit, former Chief of Staﬀ to FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler).
29likely to generate an excessive number of fast-track requests that could heavily burden the FDA’s limited
resources.
A 2003 study by the biotechnology consulting ﬁrm, Recombinant Capital, highlights other potential issues
with the fast-track system.172 The study primarily examined therapeutics developed by biotechnology com-
panies, representing nearly half of the products that received fast-track designation between 1998 and 2003.173
Recombinant Capital found that fast-track designation does not necessarily provide a faster, smoother ride
through the FDA approval process and in fact may “ﬂip traditional drug development on its head” by ex-
posing higher product failure rates in later stages of development.174 Of the 81 products examined in the
study, 33 of them had proceeded to Phase III trials.175 Of the 33 Phase III products, 20 had failed to meet
primary endpoints in Phase III or had inadequate Phase III data for FDA approval.176 Considering the
average failure rate for all drugs in Phase III is 30%, the study concluded that fast-track products were
twice as likely to fail in Phase III trials.177 Additionally, the study found that nearly half of the fast-track
products that had made it to the NDA stage had either been terminated or were lingering for an average of
23 months.178
172See Piercey, supra note 148.
173Id. Recombinant Capital runs a commercial database or clinical trials with most of the focus on biotechnology ﬁrms and
their partnerships with larger companies. The Tufts CSDD study appears to have covered a larger number of products from
both biotechnology companies and large pharmaceutical businesses.
174Id. Traditionally, as a drug moves through the clinical testing phases, the likelihood of proving safety and eﬃcacy increases.
175Id.
176Id. Although the Recombinant Capital database is limited to potentially higher-risk products, 61% of fast-track products
in the study that reached Phase III failed to proceed to NDA/BLA submission.
177Id.; see also Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen and Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of
Drug Development Costs, Journal of Health Economics, Mar. 2003, at 151. The failure rate for drugs in Phase III trials from
the late 1990s is about 30%. Failure can be due to lack of eﬃcacy, safety issues, or economic factors.
178See Piercey, supra note 148. Of the 81 products in the study, 25 had progressed to the point of NDA/BLA submission.
Twelve of those products were approved, but 11 products remained. Five of the 11 remaining products have been terminated,
and the other six remaining products lingered.
30While somewhat discouraging, these results are not necessarily a condemnation of the fast-track program.
First, the fact that a large number of products even proceeded to Phase III suggests that the population
of products studied may have been inherently challenged.179 Second, the data may simply highlight that
fast-track products are a high-risk endeavor since they generally address medical conditions where no alter-
native treatments exist. Third, according to the Tufts CSDD, the fast-track system provides an ancillary
beneﬁt by accelerating the inevitable clinical failure of certain experimental drugs.180 By expediting clinical
development to more quickly reach a “fast-fail,” the fast-track system can help drug companies redirect
resources to other more promising therapies.181
The Recombinant Capital study also establishes some legitimacy to the criticisms that the fast-track program
is primarily a tool to raise publicity and capital. The FDA has informally stated that larger pharmaceutical
companies apply for fast-track designation at a lower rate than smaller startups because the small companies
believe it adds value to their business.182 Recombinant Capital examined public companies with fast-track
products and found that stock prices on average jumped 11% and the volume of shares traded increased by
722% on the day fast-track designation was announced.183 Additionally, 45% of the products studied by
Recombinant Capital requested fast-track after the start of Phase III trials, indicating early collaborative
beneﬁts may not have been the driving force behind pursuing the designation.184 As a result, it remains
unclear exactly how much of the beneﬁt of fast-track is due to the public relations boost provided by the
designation and how much is due to improved regulatory mechanisms.
Outside of the Recombinant Capital study, other concerns still remain regarding the fast-track system.
179Id. Christopher-Paul Milne, of the Tufts CSDD, examined the Recombinant Capital results and noted that the products
involved in the study may have intrinsically been doomed for failure.
180Id.
181Id.
182Id. (quoting John Jenkins, director of the Oﬃce of New Drugs at CDER).
183Id. Of the 81 products in the study, only 33 of them were examined for stock price. Data was not available for all companies
because some were private and others did not publicly disclose fast-track designation.
184Id.
31Even though fast-track has been around since 1998, the actual usage and eﬀectiveness of rolling reviews of
NDAs/BLAs has yet to be established. According to Jenkins, through 2003, the FDA had conducted rolling
review on a “resource available basis.”185 These comments appear to ﬁt with the FDA’s initial guidance that
approval review may not occur until an entire application has been ﬁled and the potential resource crunch
due to a loose interpretation of the “serious” condition requirement.186 On paper, rolling review seems like
an eﬀective mechanism of expediting the approval process, but if the FDA does not have the resources to
utilize it, then one of the most tangible beneﬁts of the fast-track system remains in question. The FDA hopes
that pilot programs will be able to speciﬁcally identify any beneﬁt of continuous marketing applications.187
The fast-track program has only been in existence for seven years, and the ultimate success of the program
has yet to be determined. Although both the Tufts CSDD and the Recombinant Capital studies examine
a limited set of fast-track products, both establish quantiﬁable beneﬁts and reasonable concerns from the
regulations. Nevertheless, the FDA records show that the fast-track system appears to have expedited the
development and approval of important medications. Considering the FDA has limited resources to evaluate
new disease therapies in the United States, the fast-track program, at the very least, enables reviewers to
prioritize drugs that focus on treating important and serious conditions.
Section III. Backlash Against the FDA and Implications for Oncology Drugs
The FDA has made truly great strides in expediting the approval of drugs using the fast-track and accelerated
185Id.
186See Fast-Track Guidance, supra note 113, at 14.
187See Draft Guidance for Industry Continuous Marketing Applications, supra note 126.
32approval mechanisms, as analyses of the two regulatory programs show that important life-saving drugs have
reached the market faster. Unfortunately, recent criticism of the FDA has some industry observers concerned
that the agency may return to a more conservative approach of expediting drug approvals. In particular, the
cancer community is extremely worried about the trend set by FDA oncology decisions over the past year.
However, after examining the recent track record and policy decisions of the FDA, the concerns of cancer
patient advocates may be overstated.
A. General Public Backlash Against the FDA
Recent developments regarding FDA decisions, including the discovery of major safety concerns regarding
antidepressant use by children, the withdrawal of two widely used arthritis medications, and the withdrawal
of an accelerated approval multiple sclerosis drug, have generated a substantial public backlash against
the FDA for failing to fulﬁll one of its fundamental missions – ensuring the safety of drugs in the United
States.188 These events have created an environment where the FDA is under ﬁre from patients, consumer
advocates, the medical community, public policy experts, and members of Congress.189 Much of the focus
of their criticism has been on whether or not the FDA is approving drugs too quickly and without proper
post-marketing safeguards. Additionally, some observers feel that the agency has been working harder to
protect the pharmaceutical industry rather than the general public.190 As a result, the fast-track program
and accelerated approval have received a great deal of scrutiny over the past year for enabling potentially
dangerous drugs to enter the market.
188Susan Okie, What Ails the FDA?, New England Journal of Medicine, Mar. 17, 2005, at 1063; see also Mathews and
Hechinger, supra note 9, at B1.
189Id.
190See Gorman, supra note 1, at 58.
33Historically, fast-track and accelerated approval regulations have been relatively free of controversy. However,
in 2000, two withdrawals of drugs approved by priority review elicited criticism that the FDA was loosening
guidelines intended to protect the public.191 The ﬁrst withdrawal of a high proﬁle, priority reviewed drug
came in March of 2000 when the FDA advised Warner-Lambert to pull the diabetes treatment Rezulin
from the market.192 The FDA approved Rezulin in January 1997 after a six-month priority review.193
Although Rezulin was the agency’s fastest approval ever for a diabetes drug, the process was not entirely
smooth.194 The original FDA medical oﬃcer assigned to the drug, who actually supported its rejection due
to potential liver toxicity, was replaced with a more supportive FDA oﬃcer under somewhat questionable
circumstances.195 Rezulin was the ﬁrst of a new generation of novel compounds to treat adult-onset, type
2 diabetes, and the FDA based its swift approval decision on the drug’s unique mode of action and clinical
beneﬁt to people who did not respond to other treatments.196 Over the course of the next three years,
Rezulin became a multi-billion dollar success, but several cases emerged of Rezulin users who developed
life-threatening liver dysfunction, prompting the drug to be withdrawn from the United Kingdom.197 In
March of 1999, after multiple FDA/Warner-Lambert meetings and label changes, the FDA Endocrine and
Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee reviewed the link between Rezulin and liver toxicity and ultimately
decided to restrict the drug to patients who did not respond to other treatments, provided that patients
undergo regular liver testing and the label indicated potential liver toxicity.198 By March of 2000, the FDA
191See Food & Drug Letter, supra note 165.
192Id.
193Robert K. Jenner, Rezulin: Fast Track to Failure, Trial, July 2000, at 39.
194Id. at 40.
195Id.; see also Willman, supra note 171 (7 deadly drugs), at A1; David Willman, Risk Was Known as FDA OKd Fatal Drug
Study, L.A. Times, Mar. 11, 2001, at A1. The FDA medical oﬃcer reviewing Rezulin, Dr. John L. Gueriguian recommended
the drug be rejected on the basis of potential liver and heart toxicity, and the drug’s ineﬀectiveness in lower blood sugar.
Warner-Lambert allegedly complained about Gueriguian, and he was removed from the review, and his recommendation was
extricated from the FDA’s ﬁles. E-mails have been discovered showing the FDA potentially colluded with Warner-Lambert to
have Gueriguian “eased out.”
196See Food & Drug Letter, supra note 165.
197See Jenner, supra note 193, at 40 and 46.
198Id. At the advisory committee meeting, a presentation by a medical epidemiologist working for the FDA indicated that
physicians were not adequately reading the warning letters, the FDA had probably only received reports of about 10% liver
damage cases, and Rezulin appeared to be the main cause of the liver damage and deaths reported. A potentially concerning note
34was faced with evidence of hundreds of likely deaths due to Rezulin-linked liver failure and advised Warner-
Lambert to withdraw the drug.199 Part of the withdrawal decision was also based on the fact that two safer
drugs with similar modes of action were now available on the market.200 The public was concerned that
the inﬂuence of pharmaceutical companies drove the FDA to delay the withdrawal of a drug that was long
suspected to be dangerous.201
Eight months after the withdrawal of Rezulin, the FDA faced another predicament with a priority-reviewed
drug. Glaxo Wellcome’s Lotronex was approved in February of 2000 under a six-month priority review for
the treatment of inﬂammatory bowel disease.202 While the approval process for Lotronex lacked the dubious
undertones of Rezulin’s review, the FDA immediately began receiving reports of Lotronex users experiencing
serious complications requiring hospitalization and/or surgical intervention.203 Concerned with the newfound
risks of Lotronex, the FDA and Glaxo Wellcome released a Medication Guide for consumers and updated
the labeling for the drug.204 By November of 2000, the FDA had received 70 cases of complications with
Lotronex, with 34 hospitalizations and three suspected deaths.205 Glaxo Wellcome voluntarily withdrew the
drug from the market, and once again, the FDA faced harsh criticism over the agency’s risk/beneﬁt analyses
is that prior to the vote, the FDA appointed two new members to the advisory panel that had ﬁnancial ties to Warner-Lambert.
199See Jenner, supra note 193, at 46; see also David Willman, Hidden Risks, Lethal Truths, L.A. Times, June 30, 2002, at
A1. By the time Rezulin was taken oﬀ the market, over 500,000 patients had taken the drug, 90 patients had experienced liver
failure, and 63 patients were conﬁrmed dead due to Rezulin.
200See Food & Drug Letter, supra note 165.
201See Jenner, supra note 193, at 46; see also David Willman, Fears Grow over Delay in Removing Rezulin, L.A. Times, Mar.
10, 2000, at A18.
202See Food & Drug Letter, supra note 165.
203Id. By June 1, 2000, the FDA received 7 reports of severe constipation, with 6 patients requiring hospitalization and
3 requiring surgery. The FDA also received 8 reports of ischemic colitis, with 4 patients requiring hospitalization. These
complications were serious considering irritable bowel syndrome is merely a functional disease that causes discomfort and
moderate pain.
204Id. The Medication Guide contained FDA approved information for pharmacists to distribute with Lotronex, and the label
was updated to clarify the contraindications of Lotronex.
205Id.
35and the decision to rapidly approve an unsafe drug.206 In addition to these two priority review drugs, other
events, including the Fen-Phen scandal and the passage of the abortion drug RU-486 have marred the FDA’s
reputation in the past.207 However, these transgressions pale in comparison to the relatively rapid succession
of recent, serious safety controversies and the ensuing public response.
The latest wave of negative events for the FDA began with the discovery of evidence that the agency and
manufacturers allegedly withheld adverse event data on the use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs) by children.208 Although the FDA issued a Public Health Advisory in October of 2003 reporting
risks of suicidal tendencies in children treated with SSRIs, the issue hit the front pages in the summer
of 2004 after New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer brought a civil suit against GlaxoSmithKline for
withholding data on the antidepressant SSRI Paxil.209 Responding to the data and highly publicized reports
of teen suicides, the FDA’s advisory committees for Psychopharmacologic and Pediatric Drugs recommended
that antidepressants carry a black box warning on the possibility of suicidal behavior in young patients; a
recommendation the FDA oﬃcially implemented in October of 2004.210 Needless to say, the FDA and
manufacturers came under ﬁre for allegedly not releasing information about adverse events, delaying action
by stumbling through the antidepressant investigation, and not supporting conclusive pediatric studies.211
206Id.
207See Bean, supra note 38, at 892. RU-486 was a political problem for many years, which inappropriately impacted its FDA
approval. The diet drugs Fen-Phen and Redux represent one of the largest mass tort lawsuits in history, with tens of thousands
of users suﬀering some kind of lung or heart damage. While Fen-Phen was never FDA approved, Redux was approved under
alleged campaigns of misinformation and manipulation of FDA oﬃcials.
208Jill Wechsler, New Questions On Safety: Vioxx, Vaccines, and SSRIs: Today’s Bad News As Tomorrow’s Agenda, Phar-
maceutical Executive, Nov. 1, 2004, at 36.
209Id.; see also Michael Johnsen, FDA Mulls Stronger Warning for Antidepressants, Drug Store News, Oct. 11, 2004, at 8.
210Id.; see also Shankar Vedantam, Depression Drugs to Carry a Warning; FDA Orders Notice of Risks for Youths, Wash.
Post, Oct. 16, 2004, at A1. Clinical trials showed that children taking antidepressants have a 4 percent risk of suicidal thoughts
and behavior, compared with a 2 percent risk among children getting placebos. The FDA’s black-box warning applies to more
than just SSRIs, including antidepressants Wellbutrin, Paxil, Celexa, Lexapro, Prozac, Luvox, Remeron, Serzone, Zoloft, and
Eﬀexor.
211Id. Other than Prozac, no other antidepressants have been speciﬁcally approved to treat depression among children.
Doctors who prescribe them are extrapolating from studies that show they are eﬀective in adults. In children with depression,
36No sooner than the FDA had ﬁnally reached a resolution of the SSRI debacle, the agency was hit with perhaps
the biggest drug safety crisis in its history – the withdrawal of Merck’s blockbuster arthritis medication Vioxx.
Like Rezulin and Lotronex, Vioxx was also approved under a six-month priority review, but unlike the two
previously withdrawn drugs, Vioxx was the drug of choice for nearly 20 million Americans.212 Vioxx was
one of a new generation of promising painkillers called COX-2 inhibitors, and the drug seemed to be able to
reduce pain and inﬂammation without the sometimes-fatal gastrointestinal side eﬀects commonly caused by
existing painkillers on the market.213 With the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) granting approval for
Vioxx for the treatment of osteoarthritis, acute pain and menstrual pain, Merck began its self-proclaimed
“biggest, fastest, and best launch ever.”214 The drug was heavily marketed to physicians and through direct-
to-consumer advertising, and by 2004, Merck was earning $2.5 billion in annual Vioxx sales.215 However, in
September of 2004, after years of outside criticism from medical professionals and Merck’s own conﬂicting
clinical studies, the company withdrew the drug after receiving deﬁnitive proof of what it had feared since
the development of Vioxx: that Vioxx signiﬁcantly increased the risk of heart attack and strokes.216
Particularly damaging to the FDA was the substantial public “whistleblowing” by Dr. David Graham,
the Associate Director for Science in the FDA’s Oﬃce of Drug Safety. Graham claimed that the agency
the overwhelming majority of clinical trials have failed to show that widely prescribed drugs are superior to placebos; see also
Wechsler, supra note 208, at 36; Okie, supra note 188, at 1063.
212Merck’s Earnings Per Share Increase 15% for 1998, Business Wire, Jan. 26, 1999; see also John Simons and David Stipp,
Will Merck Survive Vioxx?, Fortune, Nov. 1, 2004, at 90.
213Id.
214Robert Langreth, FDA Approval of Vioxx Allows Merck To Compete With New Arthritis Drugs, Wall Street
Journal, May 24, 1999, at B3; see also Merck and Co., Inc., 1999 Annual Report, 1. (Available online at:
http://www.merck.com/overview/99ar/99ar pdf frameset.html).
215Chris Adams, Merck Ads for Arthritis Drug Attract Regulatory Scrutiny, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 2002, at B6; see
also Simons and Stipp, supra note 212, at 90.
216Barbara Martinez, Anna Mathews, Joann Lublin and Ron Winslow, Expiration Date: Merck Pulls Vioxx From Market
After Link to Heart Problems, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 2004, at A1.
37allegedly ignored or attempted to silence earlier reports of Vioxx’s adverse eﬀects.217 In August of 2004,
Graham completed an epidemiological study concluding that high doses of Vioxx should never be used due to
the cardiovascular risks of the drug.218 Multiple FDA oﬃcials apparently questioned the appropriateness of
Graham drawing such a strong conclusion and requested that Graham tone down his message.219 Ultimately,
Graham altered his conclusion to note that the study casted “serious doubt” about Vioxx’s safety, and that
an estimated 28,000 cardiovascular related deaths could have been avoided by not using Vioxx.220 Despite
this study and a litany of previous epidemiological data, the FDA still did not appear willing to make any
changes to its regulation of Vioxx, and even went ahead and approved a supplemental indication to treat
juvenile rheumatoid arthritis on September 8, 2004.221 Two weeks later, Merck received compelling safety
evidence from an ongoing clinical trial that indicated Vioxx had cardiovascular risks.222 On September 30,
2004, Merck withdrew Vioxx from the worldwide market, causing the company’s stock price to plunge 27%
and its market capitalization to drop $26.8 billion in a single day.223 In the weeks following, medical experts
and an FDA report estimated the casualties caused by the drug could be in the hundreds of thousands.224
217FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?: Hearing Before the Senate Finance Comm., 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Dr. David J. Graham, Associate Director for Science, Oﬃce of Drug Safety, Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, Food and Drug Administration).
218Anna Mathews, Did the FDA Minimize Vioxx’s Red Flags?, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 10, 2004, at B1.
219Id.; see also Graham, supra note 217; Anna Mathews, FDA Oﬃcials Tried to Tone Down Report on Vioxx, Wall Street
Journal, Oct. 8, 2004, at B2. Allegedly, John Jenkins, Director of the FDA’s Oﬃce of New Drugs and member of the Oﬃce of
Drug Safety pressured Graham to change his conclusions because they were inconsistent with the FDA’s stance on drug safety.
Graham claims that during a meeting, the FDA oﬃcials questioned why he had even conducted the study and that one senior
manager called the Kaiser study a “scientiﬁc rumor.”
220Id.; see also Anna Mathews, New Vioxx Study Projects Cases of Heart Attacks, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 2004, at A2.
221See Graham, supra note 217. Even as late as September 22, a week before Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market, Graham
claims that directors and senior managers in the FDA’s Oﬃce of New Drugs and Oﬃce of Drug Safety did not believe there was
a Vioxx safety issue to deal with that wasn’t already covered by the labeling change in 2002; see also Rheumatoid Arthritis;
FDA approves VIOXX for once-daily treatment of JRA, Med. Letter on CDC and FDA, Oct. 10, 2004, at 86.
222Barbara Martinez, Anna Mathews, Joann Lublin and Ron Winslow, Expiration Date: Merck Pulls Vioxx From Market
After Link to Heart Problems, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 1, 2004, at A1. Unlike previous retrospective, epidemiological studies,
the new safety evidence came from a prospective clinical trial; eﬀectively ending Merck’s ongoing defense against outside negative
epidemiological studies that the clinical trial data showed Vioxx was safe.
223Id.
224See Simons and Stipp, supra note 212, at 90; see also Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health – Rofecoxib, Merck, and
the FDA, New England Journal of Medicine, Oct. 21, 2004, at 1707 (estimating a potential of 160,000 excess heart attacks or
strokes caused by Vioxx).
38Public outrage continues to simmer amid questions whether the FDA has become too lenient in approving
drugs through fast-track mechanisms. Speciﬁcally in response to safety concerns, the agency has advised
Pﬁzer to withdraw a similar COX-2 inhibitor, and added tougher safety warnings to other similar anti-
inﬂammatory drugs.225 But the public backlash and Graham’s provocative claims have spurred multiple
evaluations of FDA processes and plans to establish an independent Drug Safety Oversight Board within
CDER.226 Some believe the FDA’s decision to rein in the use of several popular painkillers and add further
levels of bureaucracy signals a shift in the agency’s risk/beneﬁt calculation towards over-caution.227
With the FDA being battered from all sides about the agency’s inability to regulate drug safety, the with-
drawal of the multiple sclerosis (MS) drug Tysabri could not have come at a worse time. Tysabri was the
ﬁrst MS treatment to receive approval in eight years, and based on promising data from a one-year trial,
the drug sped to market in November 2004 under Subpart H regulations.228 Unfortunately, four months
later, Tysabri was withdrawn and clinical trials were suspended after the reports of the death of one trial
participant from a rare and potentially fatal neurological infection.229 Because the adverse eﬀect is a very
rare condition that is unlikely to be detected in clinical trials, the FDA has yet to receive heavy criticism
225Marc Kaufman, Painkiller Decision Suggests Shift in FDA’s Risk-Beneﬁt Equation, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 2005, at A3.
Although Merck initiated its Vioxx withdrawal, Pﬁzer withdrew its similar drug Bextra only reluctantly and voiced concern
that the FDA was changing how it judges the value of medications. Evidence showed Bextra also could increase the risk of
heart attacks, strokes and a potentially fatal skin disease.
226See Graham, supra note 217; see also FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?: Hearing Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Dr. Sandra L. Kweder, Deputy Director, Oﬃce of New Drugs, Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration); FDA’s Safety Oversight Board Proposal Met With Mixed
Reviews, Washington Drug Letter, Feb. 21, 2005.
227See Kaufman, supra note 225, at A3. Sam Kazman, chief counsel of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, states “the
traditional FDA response to criticism is to revert to deadly overcaution...When the agency is criticized about a drug, its natural
reaction is to withdraw it and become more cautious about approving others in the future.” The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America also recognized “a perceived shift in the risk-beneﬁt evaluation.”
228Inside The Industry Tysabri: Sales Suspended After MS Drug Linked to Infection, American Health Line, Mar. 1, 2005.
Typically, MS drugs require a two-year trial, but Tysabri was found to reduce the MS relapse rate by 66% compared with a
placebo, and by 54% in combination with another MS treatment Avonex.
229Id.; see also Mathews and Hechinger, supra note 9, at B1. Biogen Idec and Elan Corp., the manufacturers of Tysabri stated
another patient may be aﬄicted with PML. Both patients were enrolled in clinical trials examining the combination of Tysabri
with another MS treatment.
39for accelerating the approval of Tysabri.230 Nevertheless, the drug’s suspension has brought accelerated
approval procedures under the public’s microscope, and is bolstering concerns that the FDA is approving
drugs with limited evidence of safety and eﬃcacy.231
The trio of negative events has placed the FDA in an unprecedented situation where the pendulum could
easily swing back towards a tougher, more risk-averse approval policy. Public furor has reached new highs
behind statements like that of Dr. Graham that “the FDA, as currently conﬁgured, is incapable of protecting
America against another Vioxx” and that “we are virtually defenseless.”232 The question is whether or not
a return to a more cumbersome, paternalistic FDA is the best solution for the United States.
B. The Cancer Community’s Fear of a More Risk-Averse FDA and ODAC
One of the unsettling implications of the potential over-reaction to the FDA’s drug safety eﬀort is the
eﬀect the backlash will have on approvals of important, life-saving cancer treatments. Since the ﬁght to
gain access to Laetrile in the 1970s, the cancer community has been one of the strongest and passionate
forces behind reforms of FDA approval policies.233 Prior to the implementation of accelerated approval and
fast-track mechanisms, cancer patient advocates long believed that the FDA’s drug approval policy was far
too conservative and paternalistic given that cancer is such a deadly disease.234 As a result, any impetus
230Id.; see also Bernadette Tansey, Hard Sell: How Marketing Drives the Pharmaceutical Industry, San Francisco Chronicle,
Mar. 3, 2005, at C1.
231See Mathews and Hechinger, supra note 9, at B1.
232See Graham, supra note 217.
233See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 46, at 557; see also Rovner, supra note 62 (Lancet FDA Speeds Up...), at 1038.
234Id.
40towards a return to more restrictive approval standards is understandably a serious concern for the cancer
community.
Compared to the average member of the public, cancer patients have an entirely diﬀerent perspective of the
FDA’s risk-beneﬁt calculus for drug approvals. Because many oncology drugs cannot discriminate between
cancerous cells and non-cancerous cells, cancer patients are often presented with the painful tradeoﬀ between
burden of treatment and burden of disease.235 Unlike reviews for other medicines, the FDA approaches cancer
drug approval with a viewpoint that eﬃcacy is of greater concern than toxicity because signiﬁcant toxicity
is generally considered acceptable for oncology drugs given the severe and often fatal nature of the disease
being treated.236 Because the impact of cancer is far more damaging than the treatments used to stop the
disease, cancer patients have a far higher risk-tolerance than the rest of the population.
The fact that realistically, many more cancer patients are dying from the disease than from adverse drug
events places the FDA in a precarious position of balancing consumer protection with a heightened impor-
tance of personal autonomy.237 Cancer patients have a vested interest in determining both how they want
to live and how they want to avoid death, and to maximize personal autonomy, they desire less intervention
by the FDA.238 Since cancer patients know that nearly every oncology treatment carries a signiﬁcant level
of risk, they believe that in the face of death, the FDA should not be restricting the approval of innova-
tive drugs based on a risk-tolerance calculation inﬂuenced by the general public.239 Although recognizing
235The FDA’s Drug Approval Process: Up To the Challenge?: Hearing Before the Senate Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Nancy Davenport-Ennis CEO, National Patient Advocate Foundation).
236Id.
237Id.; see also FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 12, 2003, at 13 (statement of Steve Walker, FDA
Advisor to the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs). According to Walker, “we lose about 800,000 or
900,000 every year to cancer and they have nowhere to go except clinical trials which are too small and too restrictive.”
238Id.
239See Davenport-Ennis, supra note 235.
41personal autonomy involves a requisite level of information, cancer patients are willing to make decisions
without all the information due to their desperate situation.240 As Michael Greenberg argues, conservative
approval policies can overlook the preferences and needs of persons whose values signiﬁcantly depart from
those of the general public.241 Expediting drugs onto market spreads the risk from some of the most helpless,
endangered citizens to a larger population. Therefore, any public momentum that threatens to shift the risk
back to those with life-threatening diseases is a worrisome development for cancer patients who have fought
so hard over the past two decades to accelerate drug approvals.
Contrary to recent public sentiment, the cancer community not only fears the prospect of more burdensome
regulatory and bureaucratic requirements, but also believes that current mechanisms to expedite drug ap-
provals are ineﬃcient. Outside of the fact that a more conservative FDA approach would unravel the gains
made by the cancer community in the past twenty years, cancer advocates feel that fast-track and acceler-
ated approval should have hastened the approval of more oncology drugs.242 Among their concerns is that
the agency lacks a sense of urgency in supporting the spirit of accelerated approval regulations, and instead
has overemphasized adverse eﬀects, statistics and process.243 Additionally, they believe that limited regula-
tory acceptance of surrogate endpoints and an overly restrictive deﬁnition of clinical beneﬁt have negatively
impacted the FDA’s risk/beneﬁt calculus for many desperate cancer patients.244 For instance, the Abigail
Alliance for Better Access to Development Drugs, a major political supporter of expediting approvals, be-
lieves that while the current regulations are “good approval mechanisms,” the standards for approving drugs
240Michael Greenberg, Information, Paternalism, and Rational Decision-Making: The Balance of FDA New Drug Approval,
13 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 663, 671-74 (2003).
241Id. at 676.
242See Walker, supra note 237, at 11.
243Id. at 11-12.
244Id.
42based on surrogate endpoints needs to be at the very least kept the same or lowered.245 Considering the
recent, substantial scrutiny of the FDA’s drug safety eﬀorts, the cancer community’s viewpoint on approval
standards is nearly the opposite of the rest of the general public. This dichotomy embodies the dilemma the
FDA faces in weighing broad social welfare against the needs of society’s most vulnerable.
Taking into account the FDA’s oncology track record in recent years, it is no surprise that patient advocates
and the media perceive that the public backlash against the agency heightens the risk of tightening the
standards for expediting oncology drug approvals. The cancer community originally had cause for concern
based on the discussions at a March 2003 ODAC meeting examining the challenges of accelerated approval.246
At that meeting, the FDA presented the status of post-marketing validation trials for eight products receiving
Subpart H approval between 1995 and 2000.247 The ODAC heard the startling evidence that the average
time between granting of accelerated approval and the completion of conﬁrmatory post-marketing studies was
projected to be ten years.248 The FDA highlighted the fact that not only were there problems convincing
patients to enroll in clinical studies after a drug had hit the market, but there seemed to be a loss of
sense of urgency by drug manufacturers in completing the studies.249 The loss of the manufacturer’s sense of
urgency was illustrated by the conﬁrmatory studies for Ontak.250 In the years following accelerated approval,
Ontak’s manufacturer was only able to enroll on average eight patients a year into conﬁrmatory studies; a
rate of enrollment far below the acceptable standard for pre-marketing clinical trials.251 The ODAC was
245Id. at 13-15.
246FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 12-13, 2003.
247FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 12-13, 2003 (statements by Dr. Ramzi Dagher, FDA Division
of Oncology Drug Products).
248Id.; see also Thomas R. Fleming, Surrogate Endpoints and FDA’s Accelerated Approval Process, Health Aﬀairs, Jan./Feb.
2005, at 75.
249Id.; see also FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 12, 2003, at 249 (statements by Thomas R. Fleming,
ODAC consultant, Professor and Chair of Biostatistics, Univ. of Wash.).
250Id.; see also Fleming, supra note 248, at 76.
251Id.
43also surprised to learn that the FDA did not have clear plans for dealing with an accelerated approval
drug where validation trials were not conclusively positive.252 For instance, the initial conﬁrmatory studies
for Ethyol injection indicated a minimal treatment beneﬁt, but the treatment continued to be marketed
as an accelerated approval drug.253 Comments regarding the “sobering” evidence presented by the FDA
were certainly not encouraging for the cancer community. Dr. Bruce Cheson, a member of the committee
stated, “[t]here will be...a little more vigilance in the decision making by the members of the committee...and
maybe a little more reluctance to approve certain drugs on some of the meager evidence which they’re being
presented.”254
Despite the pessimistic tone set by the ODAC meeting, cancer patient advocates seemed appeased by the
tenor of the FDA under the helm of Mark McClellan. McClellan was President George W. Bush’s ﬁrst
appointee as FDA commissioner in November 2002.255 Under the stewardship of McClellan, members of the
pharmaceutical industry, ﬁnancial analysts, and patient advocates perceived a marked change in attitude
towards expediting drug approvals.256 In June of 2003, McClellan announced his initiative to improve the
use of fast-track and accelerated approval mechanisms for non-immediately life-threatening diseases such
as diabetes and obesity.257 That same year also brought the accelerated approval of three new oncology
drugs, Iressa, Velcade, and Bexxar.258 The approval of Iressa is particularly noteworthy because it was
approved with very low clinical trial response rates of 10-20 percent, thereby fueling speculation that the
252Id.; see also FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 12, 2003, at 19.
253Id.; see also Fleming, supra note 248, at 76.
254FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 13, 2003 at 165 (statements by Dr. Bruce Cheson, ODAC
member).
255See Okie, supra note 188, at 1063.
256Thomas J. Bliley Jr., FDA at a Crossroads, Wash. Times, May 3, 2004, at A15; see also Gloria Lau, Cancer Experts Say
FDA Never Softened Stance on Medicines, Investor’s Business Daily, May 24, 2004, at A13.
257Christopher Rowland, FDA Chief Looks to Speed Diabetes, Obesity Drugs, Boston Globe, Jun. 4, 2003, at A1.
258See Roberts and Chabner, supra note 6, at 503.
44FDA and ODAC was relaxing the standards for cancer drugs.259 Around the same time as the Iressa approval,
McClellan seemed to echo President Clinton’s comments that the FDA and pharmaceutical companies should
be “partners, not adversaries”, by declaring that the FDA was more “industry friendly.”260
While the cancer community seemed encouraged by McClellan’s tenure as commissioner, their contentment
was cut short in March of 2004 when McClellan became administrator of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services.261 Since that time, cancer patient advocates, the pharmaceutical industry, the media,
and ﬁnancial analysts have allegedly witnessed the pendulum swinging backwards with a growing trend of
caution inﬁltrating the FDA and ODAC. The ﬁrst signal that the FDA may be becoming more restrictive in
approving cancer drugs came in May of 2004 when the ODAC examined the applications for two fast-track
cancer medications, Genasense and RSR13.262 The two drugs were up for approval with the agency at a
crossroads; many observers were interested in how ﬂexible the ODAC would be considering the two drugs had
limited statistical eﬃcacy evidence.263 Ultimately, the ODAC and the FDA rejected the accelerated approval
of both drugs.264 The ODAC found that clinical trial data for Genasense showed no statistically signiﬁcant
evidence of increased survival rates for melanoma patients, and RSR13’s clinical trials were poorly structured
and also lacked statistically signiﬁcant evidence of eﬀectiveness in treating breast cancer patients.265
Despite the fact that the FDA did approve multiple other cancer treatments following the Genasense/RSR13
meeting, cancer patient advocates viewed the ODAC’s recommendation to reject the accelerated approval
259See Lau, supra note 256, at A13.
260Id.; see also Willman, supra note 171, at A1.
261See Okie, supra note 188, at 1063.
262FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, May 3-4, 2004.
263See Bliley Jr., supra note 256, at A15; see also Lau, supra note 256, at A13.
264Id.
265See FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, May 3-4, 2004; see also Regulatory News FDA: Decisions on
Cancer RX Could Indicate New Agency Trend, American Health Line, Apr. 26, 2004, at 7.
45of Marqibo in December of 2004 as a dangerous precedent.266 Inex Pharmaceutical applied for accelerated
approval of Marqibo as a treatment for relapsed, aggressive non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.267 The company was
hopeful because Marqibo was getting a 25% response rate and there were no approved drugs to treat the
condition on the market.268 Unfortunately, the ODAC and the FDA criticized the design and analysis of
the clinical data and recommended against approval of the drug.269
While the ODAC has rejected accelerated approvals in the past, the committee not only rejected the drug
based on statistical evidence, but also because other available oncology drugs treated the same condition
through oﬀ-label regimens.270 Fast-track and accelerated approvals are generally for treatments for an unmet
need, and as a result, candidate drugs are typically compared to “available therapies.”271 While the FDA
had narrowly deﬁned “available therapy” in the past in order to reduce the hurdles for drugs to reach the
market through accelerated pathways, the ODAC construed “available therapies” in oncology as including
unapproved oﬀ-label uses of drugs with “compelling” evidence of eﬃcacy in the scientiﬁc literature.272
ODAC’s new practice of comparing new drugs to unapproved uses of available drugs signaled a shift in
policy that could make it harder for cancer drugs to get approved in the future.273 Additionally, members of
ODAC, the FDA, and outside advisers all expressed concern that pharmaceutical companies may be abusing
the accelerated approval mechanisms.274 Several members of the ODAC praised the committee’s chair, Dr.
Silvana Martino, for “speaking the truth” that pharmaceutical companies have continuously pressured the
266See Accelerated Approvals – Biologics, supra note 131; see also FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Dec.
1, 2004; Gottlieb, supra note 10.
267Martin Braun, Inex Gets Sucker-Punched by U.S. Drug Regulators, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 4, 2004, at B2.
268Id.
269Id. The FDA questioned the validity of some of the clinical data and disregarded it, dropping the response rate to 12%.
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271See FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Dec. 1, 2004, at 293-95 (statements of Dr. Maitreyee Hazarika).
272Brieﬁng and Opinion: New Drug Approval, The Journal Editorial Report, Dec. 10, 2004 (quot-
ing Scott Gottlieb, a former senior policy adviser to the Commissioner of the FDA). Available at:
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/journaleditorialreport/121004/brieﬁng.html.
273See Gottlieb, supra note 10.
274See FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Dec. 1, 2004, at 386-69 (statements of Dr. Silvana Martino,
Acting Chair of ODAC; Richard Pazdur, FDA Division of Oncology Drug Products; Dr. Otis W. Brawley, ODAC member).
46FDA to approve drugs with lower response rates and participants.275 Martino noted:
I have sat on this committee for about three years now, and it almost occurs to me
that we are looking for what is the least amount of data to be convincing, and I
think that is the wrong approach, but that is what I see that we do, especially with
accelerated approval, is what is the least amount that you can show me, to which I
will then give you a reward for that. I actually think that as a medical community,
we have to rethink what our objectives are and what our purpose are.276
The ODAC’s new perspective on accelerated approval has generated fear in cancer patient advocates that the
FDA may now require overwhelming statistical eﬃcacy evidence.277 The ODAC’s more cautious approach
has been interpreted by some as a response to the general backlash against the FDA.
Three months after the ODAC’s decision to reject Marqibo, the cancer community was dealt another blow
when conﬁrmatory studies for Iressa, the accelerated approval drug heralded as a signal the FDA was
becoming more lenient on cancer treatments, failed to show the drug prolonged lives.278 Iressa represents
the ﬁrst time the FDA is faced with an accelerated approval cancer drug with unfavorable post-marketing
studies, and the FDA’s response will likely set a precedent for how the agency deals with failed validation trials
in the future.279 The ultimate fate of Iressa is yet to be determined, as the FDA will not make a regulatory
decision on the drug until June 2005.280 However, the public response has already turned negative with the
consumer advocacy group Public Citizen petitioning the FDA to withdraw the drug, citing multiple failed
275Id. at 373.
277See Gottlieb, supra note 10; see also Braun, supra note 267, at B2.
278Renee Twombly, FDA Oncology Committee Debates Iressa’s Status Following Negative Trial Results, Journal of the Na-
tional Cancer Institute, Apr. 6, 2005, at 473.
279Iressa Decision to Set Precedent for Negative Fast-Track Trials, FDA Week, Mar. 11, 2005.
280FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 4, 2005, at 12-13 (statements of Dr. Richard Pazdur, FDA
Division of Oncology Drug Products). The FDA has withdrawn the drug from the market because certain patients with a
speciﬁc genetic proﬁle responded well to Iressa, and further statistical analysis needs to be completed on the conﬁrmatory trial
data. However, a “Dear Doctor” letter was sent out advising physicians to consider other treatments.
47clinical trials and evidence of Iressa-related deaths in Japan.281 Even more damning is the open remorse
exhibited by at least one ODAC member who claims the committee and Iressa’s manufacturer, AstraZeneca,
mishandled the drug and that patients are owed an apology.282 The fact that an accelerated approval drug
failed conﬁrmatory trials, coupled with the statements by ODAC and Public Citizen’s petition, further
worries the cancer community that the accelerated approval of oncology treatments is threatened in the
future.283 As the events of the past few months compound on one another, the speciﬁc actions within the
oncology arena coupled with the general public backlash against the FDA have created a perception that
the embattled FDA may adopt a more conservative framework for evaluating cancer drugs.
C. A More Risk-Averse ODAC and FDA: Media Myth?
While the events over the past year appear to cast a grim outlook on the expedited approval of cancer drugs,
the cancer community’s fears of an overly cautious ODAC and FDA may be unreasonable and based on hy-
perbole perpetrated by the media. First of all, claims that the FDA is more restrictive in the post-McClellan
era fail to recognize that McClellan did not have any direct inﬂuence over ODAC decisions.284 Although
McClellan may have presented sound bites that indicated the FDA was open to more collaboration with
pharmaceutical companies, he never stated the agency would begin approving drugs by lowering safety and
281Sidney Wolfe, Peter Lurie, and Elizabeth Barbehenn, Petition to the FDA to Remove the Can-
cer Drug Geﬁtinib (IRESSA) From the Market, HRG Publication #1728, Mar. 4, 2005. Available at:
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7369&secID=1655&catID=126.
282FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 4, 2005, at 124-25 (statements of Dr. Otis Brawley, ODAC
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exactly how this drug should be used in the treatment of lung cancer...if we had held oﬀ in getting it available to people two,
three years ago, those studies would have been done...the failure to totally ﬁnd and totally categorize that estrogen receptor is
the reason why we are in the pickle that we are in today.”
283FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 4, 2005, at 97-100, 132-33 (statements of Laurie Fenton, President
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48eﬃcacy standards.285 Talk of a post-McClellan FDA conservatism was likely a construct of the pharmaceu-
tical industry and the ﬁnancial markets to cover up for over-conﬁdent speculation regarding oncology drug
approvals following the approval of Iressa with such a low response rate.286
Regarding the eﬀect of the recent public backlash against the FDA, many doomsayers are quick to forget
that most of the concerns regarding accelerated approval that the ODAC has “suddenly” developed actually
existed back in March of 2003. Despite ODAC’s critical examination of Subpart H, the committee continued
to recommend several oncology drugs for accelerated approval and the FDA granted fast-track status to
multiple experimental candidates.287 In fact, not only did the FDA grant accelerated approval to Iressa,
Velcade, Bexxar, and two Gleevec supplemental applications in the months after the ODAC aired its concerns
about Subpart H, but the agency also approved Erbitux, Alimta, Clolar, and supplemental applications for
Femara and Bexxar in 2004.288 Clolar, which was even approved without conﬁrmed validation trial plans,
was recommended for approval at the same ODAC meeting where Marqibo was rejected.289 Moreover, the
ODAC has repeatedly stated its support for the fast-track and accelerated approval regulations, which is
demonstrated by the fact there are more than ﬁfty oncology drugs in development with fast-track designa-
tion.290 Even though members of ODAC have made statements indicating a desire to “rethink objectives”
and perhaps require more rigorous clinical trial data for accelerated approval, the committee’s actions speak
louder than words. In the wake of the Iressa conﬁrmatory trials outcomes, the ODAC’s comments appear
to be a vague warning to pharmaceutical companies to not come in aiming for the lowest possible response
285Id. (quoting Dr. Michael Friedman, former FDA deputy and commissioner).
286Id.
287See Appendix A, Fast-Track and Accelerated Approval Oncology Drugs.
288See Accelerated Approvals – NDAs and Accelerated Approvals – Biologics, supra note 131. The FDA granted accelerated
approval to a new indication of Femara for the treatment of breast cancer in women who have completed tamoxifen therapy.
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290See FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 13, 2003 at 200 (statements of Dr. Richard Pazdur, FDA
Division of Oncology Drug Products); see also FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Dec. 1, 2004, at 370-71;
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49rates, but the committee has not set unreasonable expectations for clinical trial eﬀectiveness. Clearly, the
ODAC does not have a blanket rule of over-caution in eﬀect, and the fact that two new oncology drugs
and two new oncology indications were granted accelerated approval after McClellan left for his new post
indicates the purported policy shift in the post-McClellan era is a misperception created by the media and
biased observers.291
The decisions faced by ODAC in the current environment are no diﬀerent than the balancing of risks and
beneﬁts the committee has undertaken in years past. True, there is a growing general public sentiment
for caution, but because the cancer community’s risk-tolerance is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than that of other
consumers, the ODAC must still weigh the heightened importance of personal autonomy versus a paternalistic
need to protect cancer patients from dangerous or ineﬀective drugs. Although critics of the ODAC’s recent
actions claim there is a disturbing trend towards restricting approvals, they easily overlook the fact that
the Subpart H oncology drugs rejected by the committee had serious clinical data deﬁciencies. While the
ODAC saw some positive eﬀects from Genasense, the clinical trial data showed no signiﬁcant evidence of
increased survival rate and the committee believed both the medical community and the drug’s sponsor did
not have enough of an understanding of the drug to optimize its utility.292 RSR13 showed limited evidence
that the drug could extend the lives of breast cancer patients by 4.1 months, but the evidence was ﬁshed
out of the data from a larger study and did not meet the statistical hurdles for eﬀectiveness.293 Marqibo
also had questionable response rate data, but even at the drug’s highest reported response rate, other well
291See Okie, supra note 188, at 1063. McClellan left to become administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
in March 2004. Alimta was granted accelerated approval in August of 2004, and Clolar was granted accelerated approval in
December of 2004. The Femara supplemental NDA was granted in November of 2004. The Bexxar supplemental BLA was
granted in December of 2004.
292See FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, May 3, 2004.
293Id.; see also Lau, supra note 256, at A13.
50established oﬀ-label regimens had better response rates.294 However, for each of these drugs, there were
patients who had positive responses. Does this mean the FDA should be granting accelerated approval for
these drugs? The reality is that once these drugs are not approved, their sponsor companies may terminate
their development due to ﬁnancial constraints.295 At the same time, were the FDA to approve them, not
only would there be drugs available on the market that are ineﬀective for many patients, but enrollment in
clinical trials to conﬁrm the eﬀect of the drugs would be severely limited.296
The purpose of accelerated approval is to rapidly introduce drugs intended to treat life-threatening diseases
when the inadequacy of existing treatments creates an immediate unmet medical need. In the case of
Marqibo, the drug does not fulﬁll the immediate need for a non-Hodgkins lymphoma treatment because it has
a lower response rate than other existing therapies.297 While those alternative therapies are not “approved”
under the FDA rubric, they do represent the current standard of care for treating relapsed, aggressive non-
Hodgkins lymphoma.298 Although cancer activists claim that there are some patients responding to Marqibo
and that all non-Hodgkins lymphoma suﬀerers should be given the chance to decide among therapies, the
rejection of accelerated approval does not mean that Marqibo cannot ever enter the market; it means that
Marqibo cannot enter the market early based on limited clinical data when other more eﬀective therapies
exist.
To the lay observer, the ODAC and FDA’s decision to reject these marginal cancer drugs goes directly
against recognizing the personal autonomy of cancer patients to choose which therapy they want to use to





51survive. The regulation of drugs by the FDA has been viewed as a justiﬁed form of paternalism because
it forces manufacturers to develop a wealth of data supporting a drug’s safety and eﬀectiveness, while
also protecting consumers from unquantiﬁed risks.299 In theory, personal autonomy may be maximized if
there were no regulation of drugs and patients could weigh the pros and cons of a full variety of diﬀerent
treatments. However, most members of society, since the time of the Elixir of Sulfanilamide, have welcomed
the FDA’s constraints on individual freedom because drug regulations generate a great deal of information
and also protect the public health. Even though cancer patients in particular have a lower risk threshold
and are willing to make decisions with imperfect information, a completely unregulated market would likely
make it impossible for these desperate patients and their caregivers to identify the safest and most eﬀective
treatments. Increasing the number of drugs to choose from without the requisite insights to guide decisions,
and allowing access to costly, potentially toxic, and questionably eﬀective treatments does not seem to be
in the best interests of patients. Therefore, some form of FDA paternalism is necessary in order to check
unsafe, irrational behavior inﬂuenced by the devastating consequences of terminal illnesses.
Based on this policy standpoint of the FDA as a valuable gatekeeper, the ODAC’s recent decisions reﬂect a
careful balancing of enabling personal autonomy while simultaneously protecting vulnerable cancer patients.
The rejections of Genasense, RSR13, and Marqibo on the basis of poor clinical trial data send signals to
future applicants that they must design better studies to provide more useful information. While the cancer
community may think that these rejections stiﬂe individual freedom by reducing the number of choices, the
decisions in fact improve personal autonomy by forcing the creation of better information on which patients
can base their potentially life-saving decisions. Additionally, because some experimental therapies are still
available to patients through the FDA’s expanded access programs, there is still the opportunity for patients
299See Greenberg, supra note 240, at 672.
52who have a positive response to make enhanced personal autonomy decisions based on the availability of
Subpart H rejected drugs. From a public health perspective, the ODAC’s decisions may seem paternalistic,
but they do serve to mitigate cancer patients’ exposure to risk. In the case of Marqibo, alternative therapies
with proven eﬀectiveness already exist on the market, and the introduction of an inferior product could
confuse and ultimately harm cancer patients. If the FDA approved Genasense and RSR13, the agency could
endanger the lives of cancer patients who choose to use drugs with very limited eﬀectiveness. Although
maintaining rigorous clinical trial standards could marginally increase the number of cancer deaths due to
lack of access to a treatment, if patients and doctors don’t have the proper amount of information or are
using products with limited eﬀectiveness, then there could be a far greater number of unnecessary fatalities.
Considering the fact that the ODAC and the FDA have continued to expedite oncology drugs in the wake
of the public backlash, the agency’s actual risk/beneﬁt calculus does not seem to have changed signiﬁcantly
from prior years. Even if the pendulum swings back a little, the shift could be considered positive for cancer
patients because it lowers their exposure to risky medicines and enables them to better exercise their personal
autonomy by making more informed decisions.
Section IV. FDA & ODAC Opportunities to Reform
Despite the fact that the ODAC does not appear to have returned to a more conservative approach toward
oncology drug approvals, there are forces at work that could drive the FDA to implement more restrictive
mechanisms for all drug approvals as a whole. The FDA has already announced plans to establish a Drug
Safety Oversight Board to oversee the management of drug safety issues and provide emerging information
53to doctors and patients about the risks and beneﬁts of pharmaceutical products.300 Additionally, Senate
Finance Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley and Senator Christopher Dodd are expected to introduce a
bill establishing a truly independent center for drug safety that would report directly to the FDA commis-
sioner.301 The safety center would not have sole authority to withdraw a drug from the market or hold veto
power of new drug approvals, but it would clearly create another level of bureaucracy to an already com-
plicated approval process.302 Particularly troublesome is the thought that a new agency would decentralize
the medical expertise for a given drug because there would have to be separate experts involved in reviewing
the drug for approval and for evaluating post-approval safety.303 While the likelihood of the passage of the
Grassley-Dodd bill is unknown, this wave of public outrage and calls for congressional activity provide the
FDA and ODAC with an excellent environment to push for improvements to the fast-track and accelerated
approval mechanisms for cancer drugs that appease both patient advocates and drug safety critics.
First, the FDA can establish a clear process to use when validation trials for an accelerated approval product
fail to show conclusively positive results. To date, no accelerated approval cancer drug has ever been
withdrawn, and for over twelve years, the agency has held a vague threat over manufacturer’s heads that
a product failing conﬁrmatory trials may be withdrawn from the market.304 Iressa’s failed validation trials
place the FDA and ODAC at a unique milestone, with the chance to determine exactly what the agency will
do when an accelerated approval drug’s conﬁrmatory trials show a lack of eﬀectiveness.305 As it stands now,
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54the accelerated approval regulations allow a drug with potential clinical beneﬁt, but also potential serious
safety risks that cannot be detected from relatively short-term trials, to be marketed almost indeﬁnitely.306
Because accelerated approval involves exposing cancer patients to a calculated, but higher risk, conﬁrmatory
trials to prove safety and eﬃcacy must be conducted.307 If those trials fail, the FDA should respond strongly
by either withdrawing the drug or severely restricting it. In the case of Iressa, perhaps the FDA can leave
the drug on the market but restrict its use to those patients who have already responded positively to the
treatment. Leaving the drug on the market with a strong restriction should appease both cancer activists
who claim that patients are stockpiling Iressa, and safety advocates who think the drug is dangerous. By
setting a precedent with Iressa, the FDA can enhance predictability of the agency’s post-approval decision-
making, send a signal to companies pursuing accelerated approval that conﬁrmatory studies must produce
good information, and at the same time, encourage pharmaceutical companies to only apply for accelerated
approval with drugs that are truly likely to be successful in post-marketing studies.
Another signiﬁcant area for the FDA to take action on is ensuring manufacturers complete conﬁrmatory
trials in a timely fashion. Although the accelerated approval regulations do not require validation studies
to be ongoing at the time of approval, drug manufacturers must validate pre-market safety and eﬀectiveness
data with post-market clinical trials in order to move from a conditional approval to a full approval status.308
As the accelerated approval of Clolar in December of 2004 shows, even though the FDA expects validation
trials to be underway at the time of approval, the agency is willing to grant Subpart H approval without
identiﬁcation of conﬁrmatory studies.309 Unfortunately, the FDA has not been successful in prompting
306See Fleming, supra note 248, at 76; see also Table 1.
307See Shulman and Brown, supra note 5, at 514-15.
308Id.
309See FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Dec. 1, 2004, at 16.
55pharmaceutical manufacturers to ﬁnish follow-up studies on accelerated approval drugs. As seen in Table
1, only ten out of twenty-nine accelerated approval oncology drugs, biologics, or supplemental applications
have converted to full approvals.
As the ODAC examined in the March 2003 meeting, the average time between the granting of accelerated
approval for an oncology drug and the completion of conﬁrmatory studies is ten years.310 Based on these
lengthy delays between Subpart H approval and the conclusion of validation studies, accelerated approval
almost becomes



























































Temozolomide (Temodal) 1999 Anaplastic astrocytoma Full approval
Denileukin diftitox
(Ontak)
1999 Cutaneous T-cell lymphoma Not yet upgraded
Liposomal cytarabine
(DepoCyt)
1999 Lymphomatous meningitis Not yet upgraded
Celecoxib (Celebrex) 1999 Reduction of colonic polyps Not yet upgraded
Gemtuzumab ozogamicin
(Mylotarg)
2000 Acute myelogenous leukemia Not yet upgraded


















57Oxaliplatin (Eloxatin) 2002 Colon cancer Full approval
Anastrozole (Arimidex) 2002 Breast cancer Not yet upgraded
Imatinib mesylate
(Gleevec)
2002 Newly diagnosed CML Not yet upgraded
Imatinib mesylate
(Gleevec)






Geﬁtinib (Iressa) 2003 Non–small-cell lung cancer Not yet upgraded
Bortezomib (Velcade) 2003 Multiple myeloma Full approval
Tositumomab (Bexxar) 2003 Low-grade non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma
Not yet upgraded
Cetuximab (Erbitux) 2004 Colon cancer Recent approval
Pemetrexed (Alimta) 2004 Non–small-cell lung cancer Recent approval
Letrozole (Femara) 2004 Breast cancer following
tamoxifen therapy
Recent approval
Clofarabine (Clolar) 2004 Pediatric relapsed/refractory
acute leukemia
Recent approval




Table 1. Post-marketing status for accelerated approval oncology drugs, biologics, and supplemental appli-
cations 1995-2004.311
equivalent to receiving full approval. Because a drug receiving accelerated approval enjoys the same commer-
cial access as a fully approved treatment, manufacturers lose their sense of urgency in completing studies. The
fact that AstraZeneca completed the Iressa validation studies quickly, but then found negatively conclusive
results, is likely to further disincentivize manufacturers from completing clinical studies. While pharmaceu-
tical companies are unlikely to completely shirk due diligence requirements because of the potential harm
to their reputations, there are several operational constraints that make it diﬃcult for companies to rapidly
fulﬁll their conﬁrmatory trial obligations. First, validation study designs may be either too complex to
311Data based on information from Roberts and Chabner, supra note 6, at 503, Dagher et. al., supra note 107, at 1501-02,
Accelerated Approvals – NDAs, Accelerated Approvals – NDA Supplements, supra note 131. See also, Appendix A.
58carry out, or they may be randomized, placebo controlled studies. In the case of randomized clinical trials,
desperate patients are unlikely to enroll if they know they may receive a placebo instead of a new cancer
treatment.312 Furthermore, randomized validation trials generate ethical concerns since physicians may have
to violate the standard of care by enrolling dying patients in trials with the knowledge that some patients
will not receive a treatment.313 In some cases, validation trials may not proceed quickly due to enrollment
hesitation brought on by the excessive toxicity of a drug.314 Finally, in the rare circumstance, conﬁrmatory
trials may not get completed due to competition for patients with another drug on the market or concurrent
clinical studies of a competitor drug intended to treat the same disease.315
Long delays in ﬁnishing conﬁrmatory trials can have several negative impacts. First, from a patient per-
spective, conﬁrmatory trials are necessary to establish deﬁnitive proof of safety and eﬃcacy for a drug that
is likely being used to save lives. Taking costly, toxic, and ineﬀective drugs inordinately harms patients,
especially if another treatment is available. Second, if sponsors take a long time to ﬁnish conﬁrmatory trials,
that means that secondary trials to study diﬀerent doses, indications, and pharmacokinetics in speciﬁc pop-
ulations are not likely to even get started. Third, if accelerated approval drugs are on the market under the
assumption they have some eﬃcacy, then perhaps the research and development of truly eﬀective treatments
is also delayed. The faster an accelerated drug is shown to be eﬀective or ineﬀective, the more pressure there
is to develop a better or actually eﬀective alternative.
312Edward Susman, Accelerated Approval Seen as Triumph and Roadblock for Cancer Drugs, Journal of the National Cancer
Institute, Oct. 20, 2004, at 1495.




59The current public backlash against the FDA provides the agency and ODAC the political power to bol-
ster regulations surrounding conﬁrmatory trials. Some observers have proposed making it mandatory for
companies to have conﬁrmatory trials ongoing at the time of accelerated approval, or to make accelerated
approval decisions at an interim point of a larger, ultimately conﬁrmatory trial.316 While this would make
the completion of validation trials much more likely, there are signiﬁcant operational and enrollment issues
in developing a larger trial (particularly with rarer cancers) that could delay getting patients access to a
promising therapy. The FDA has also ﬂirted with the idea of implementing an accelerated approval model
similar to one used in approving AIDS treatments.317 The AIDS model typically has two randomized trials
with 1,000 patients.318 The surrogate endpoint of viral load after 24 weeks is used to provide evidence for
accelerated approval.319 Full approval is then obtained using the same study by demonstrating the eﬀect on
the same endpoint after 48 weeks.320 Unfortunately, the majority of accelerated approvals for cancer drugs
were based on studies that were either uncontrolled or compared two dose levels and did not use an active
comparator.321 Additionally, the AIDS model also runs into questionable ethical grounds if the randomized
studies utilize a placebo. As a result, the AIDS model may not be practical for most experimental cancer
drugs, or may expose cancer patients to unnecessary risk through placebo controlled studies.
Any reform dealing with conﬁrmatory trials for accelerated approval drugs needs to facilitate the acceleration
of important life-saving drugs to market and ensure that pharmaceutical companies have the proper incentives
to complete validation trials. Since most accelerated approval products are also fast-track designated drugs,
316See Susman, supra note 312, at 1495; see also FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, Mar. 12, 2003, at 15,





321See Dagher et al, supra note 107, at 1500.
60conversations regarding conﬁrmatory trials as a part of a comprehensive development program need to
integrated into formal sponsor-FDA consultations as early as possible. Pharmaceutical companies and the
FDA should work together to determine plans on dealing with post-marketing study enrollment, timely
execution of trials, potential problems with conﬁrmatory trials, and also alternative trial designs if the
initial designs fail. Speciﬁc requirements could be formalized as part of the fast-track guidance, or perhaps
implemented as a modiﬁed special protocol assessment (SPAs). SPAs are a binding agreement between the
FDA and a sponsor on a study protocol, and they may be useful in forcing diligence and collaboration between
the agency and a pharmaceutical company on validation studies.322 Another method to incentivize companies
to conduct conﬁrmatory trials at the time of approval would be to include validation trial plans as a formalized
element of accelerated drug approvals. While the ODAC may currently informally consider post-marketing
development plans in deciding whether to grant Subpart H approval, a codiﬁed decision criteria may force
pharmaceutical companies to develop more robust validation trial plans earlier. Additionally, in order to
respect the signiﬁcant operational concerns in creating larger scale trials, perhaps the agency could set up a
default rule where conﬁrmatory trials would need to be ongoing at the time of accelerated approval unless a
pharmaceutical company successfully petitions the FDA. This would compel pharmaceutical companies to
think about conﬁrmatory trials at an early stage, but also give the FDA ﬂexibility in granting accelerated
approval to important drugs like Clolar that do not have planned trials at the time of application.
While these changes to the approval process for cancer drugs are likely to be met with opposition from
the cancer community, the current public backlash against the FDA and calls for more widespread reforms
may make these incremental changes more palatable. Cancer patient advocates should also realize that these
reforms are unlikely to discourage the ODAC and the FDA from using fast-track and accelerated approval for
32221 USC § 355(b)(4).
61oncology drugs. Deﬁning a clear response for when conﬁrmatory trials fail, and also providing incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to be diligent in conducting conﬁrmatory trials will ultimately ensure that cancer
patients exercise their personal autonomy to choose from among the best and most eﬀective accelerated
oncology treatments.
Conclusion
The FDA drug approval processes have come a long way since the days of protecting the public from snake
oil salesmen. AIDS and cancer activists have toiled for years to force liberalization of FDA regulations,
and as a result, the U.S. has been rewarded with strong safety and eﬃcacy standards for drugs and also
compassionate exemptions to save terminally ill patients. Looking at the empirical analyses, the fast-track
programs and accelerated approval regulations are clearly valuable tools in providing access and expediting
commercialization of innovative, life-saving treatments. Any risk of curtailing these gains is, without question,
a considerable concern for anyone with a life-threatening disease.
Over the years, the FDA has sporadically endured episodes of bad press, but the recent controversies have
created an unprecedented swell of negative public opinion of the FDA. Consequently, the agency has already
started to succumb to public and political pressures by introducing new bureaucratic elements to drug
approval and safety monitoring procedures. Despite the pressure on the agency to reform, a response to
the public backlash against the FDA is unlikely involve draconian changes that will signiﬁcantly impact the
acceleration of oncology drug approvals. Unfortunately, the cancer community suddenly perceives a growing
conservative trend that threatens to undo the years of work spent convincing the FDA that the agency
62needs to expedite the approval of life-saving oncology drugs. However, the perception that the FDA and the
ODAC are reverting to a more conservative approval viewpoint appears to be a construct perpetrated by
media doomsayers, ﬁnancial analysts, and worried cancer activists. Not only has the FDA continued to apply
the same risk/beneﬁt calculus to oncology drugs, but the agency has also granted accelerated approval and
fast-track designation to several experimental drugs in the midst of the recent controversies. While cancer
patients claim that more restrictive approval policies will violate their personal autonomy, any potential
tightening of regulations by the FDA and ODAC will likely serve to improve the development of information
critical to making medical decisions.
For years, the ODAC has recognized a need to tweak the accelerated approval mechanisms to incentivize
pharmaceutical companies to complete important post-marketing validation studies. Combined with the
ﬁrst occurrence of an accelerated approval oncology drug with negative conﬁrmatory studies, calls for reform
of the FDA’s drug approval policies provide the agency with an excellent opportunity to embrace the winds
of change and implement stronger regulations of post-marketing studies. The recommendations in this paper
will help generate more rigorous clinical trial data to aid cancer patients in exercising their personal auton-
omy and also enable the FDA to fulﬁll its mandate and protect some of society’s most vulnerable members
from unsafe and ineﬀective drugs.
63Appendix A. Accelerated Approval and Fast-Track Oncology Drugs as of March 2005
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